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"(:-raduate vvith a career!"
"fvlakc n1ore cash!"
"Change your life!"
"It's easy! Just pick up the phone!"

These were likely some of the exhortations Trina Thon1pson heard
(between episodes of The Jerry Spiinger Show and Maury Pavich) before
deciding to enroll at ~1Ionroe College-a career-focused propricta1y (for-
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profit) college vvith can1puscs in Nc\V York and the Caribbean. r Trina
likely \Vantcd to start a career, n1akc more 1noncy, and change her life vvhcn
she enrolled in Nionroc's bachelor of business administration program in
April 2008. 2 But after graduating \Vithout a job in April 2009,'.l Trina
realized that achieving her objectives \vas not as easy as she had been led to
believe. According to 'frina, her 2. 7 GPA and her "good" attendance
record should have resulted in job intcrvic,vs and eventually cn1ployn1cnt.-lShortly thereafter, she filed a Ja,vsuit against l'vlonroc alleging inadequate
carccr-placcn1cnt assistance and seeking a tuition rcin1burscn1cnt of
$70,000.5

Trina's la,vsuit, "\vhilc laughable in sonic respects, is nonetheless reflective
of the con1111oditization of higher education-a trend that pron1otcs the
endeavor sin1ply as a n1cans to an encl instead of a con1plicated
undertaking. In that vein, the la,vsuit is also instructive of risks associated
"\vith the aggressive and often deceptive pron1otion of future benefits by
colleges havvking their 'vares. Representations niadc by son1c colleges rival
the nlost optin1istic-and often unfounded-diet pill claims. The end
result is thousands of "Trinas" entering higher education full of misguided
optimisn1 and leaving bitter, unfulfilled, and n1ost of all, in debt. Trina is
lucky-at least she earned a degree. IVfost others in her position do not. 6
Individuals vvho arc induced to enroll in an institution based on
misrepresentations arc allo"\vcd little recourse to recoup damages they n1ay
incur.7 The courts have been very reluctant to recognize certain causes of
action against higher education institutions.B And regulatory safeguards arc

1. l'vlonroc College, About I\'Ionroe, htlp://www.1nonroccollegc.edu/about1nonroe
(last visi1cd Aug. 3, 20 I 0).
2. Trina also earned an Associa1c\ degree fron1 J'vfonroe in Deccn1bcr 2006.
Con1plainl at 3, Thompson v. l\.Jonroc Coll., :'\o. 251B96-09 (iX.Y. Sup. Ct.July 24, 2009).
3. See id. (stating that Trina i.~ .~uing because rvionroc has not helped her to secure a
job).
4. Jason I<..csslcr, Alumna S11e.1 Coll.ege Bec//11.le She llasw't .Found a Job, Cl'\.'.\.CO:\!, Aug. 4·,
2009, htlp://\VW\v.cnn.c01n/2009/US/08/03/ncw.yorkjoblcss.graduate/index.htn1l.
5. See id. (noting that Trina seeks $2,000 Cor slrcss induced by her failed job search).
6. See, e.g., L.\URA G. K.NAPP ET AL., :'\xr'L CTR. FOR EDLJC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDLJC., NCES 2009-1.).), ENROl.l.:\IE!\'T L\ POSTSECONDARY J\""STITL~l"IO.\"S, FALL 2007;
GRADUATION RATES, 200 I & 2004 COHORTS; A.\"D Fl.\"A.'\CIAL STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR
2007 12 (2009), http://nccs.ed.goy/pubs2009/2009155.pd( (listing the low gradual.ion rates
for proprietary school students).
7. Patrick F. Linehan, ])reams Protected: A .1'./euJ Approach lo Policing Prop1ielary Sdwo/s'
J\1iJrepresenlalions, 89 GEO. LJ. 753, 754 (2001) ("Cnforlunately, cxist.ing legal doctrine and
regulatory regi1nes arc ill-suited to protect proprietary school students from such predatory
1narketing practices.").
8. See id. at 764-65 (describing how the acaden1ic abstention doctrine raises "a
significant obstacle" to students seeking to recover against propricta1y schools under lort
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principally focused on protecting public, rather than individual, interests.
As a result, these individuals arc left to bear the brunt of the in1propcr
actions of others. And in spite of regulatory safeguards, taxpayers pay a
heavy price as \Vcll.

This Article argues that there is an urgent need for tighter regulation of
higher education rccruitn1cnt and marketing, particularly an1ong colleges in
the proprietary sector.
Specifically, colleges that pro111otc future
c111ployn1cnt and financial benefits to induce cnrolln1cnt should be sul~jcct
to heightened disclosure rcquircn1cnts. Akin to the "triad" that n1onitors
institutions' Title IV financial aid cligibility,~ 1 federal, state, and nongovernn1cntal entities should monitor disclosures. The goal of such
oversight \vould be to prevent n1isreprcscntations fron1 being n1ade to
prospective students.
People vvho lack in-depth knovvlcclge of higher education arc frequent
targets of higher education n1isreprcsentations. They tend to be poor, 10
thus rendering the idea of escaping poverty in a matter of n1onths very
appealing. rfhey also tend to be poorly educated, 11 COJ11ing from fan1ilics
w:ith little, if any, higher education expericnce. 12 Lastly, they tend to be
older and further rcn1oved from their last educational experience than
traditional students, 13 and they arc n1orc likely to have experienced past
educational difficulty. H
These characteristics 111ake these individuals
particularly susceptible to deceptive n1arketing and unfounded pron1ises.1.1

law).

9. Irl. at 783 ("Federal law envisions a highly co1nplcx and co1nprchcnsi\'c
bureaucratic 'triad,' with state licensing syslcms and accrediting <igencics playing a
sig11ificant co1nplc1ncntary role alongside federal eligibility and ccr1ilicalion rcquiren1cnts.").
10. I0!f0rcement qfFerleraf Anti-Fmud lA11Ds in For-Prefit Educatiim: I/earing BijOre the fl. Comm.
011 Education and the M1orlfrHce, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) Q1crcinaftcr Anti-Fraud lfewi11g.1]
(statement ofRep.1Jaxine 'Vater5, 1.-Icmbcr, I-I. Co1nn1. on Education and the '·Vorkforcc).
1 ! . See id. at 8 (providing a quote fron1 an adn1issions counscloP slating that her fonner
cn1ployer enrolled students who were ill-prepared lo con1plctc the progra1n).
12. Sr.e id. at 46 (statement of ~ick Glakas, President, Career College A%ociation)
("[Se\·enly percent of proprietary school sludents] arc the first in their L-unilics to attend
college. .").
13. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOLJNT:\BlLJ'JY OFFICE, G.1\.0-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOl.5:
STR01'\GER DEPARTME:\T OF EDUCArION OVERSJGHT NEEDED TO lll·:LP E;-;rsuiu: ONLY
ELIGIBLE STUDE:\T::i RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDE\"T AID 7 (2009), available al
http:/ /www.gao.gov/new.iteins/d09600.pdr [hereinaflcr G.AO, STRO:\·GER OVERSJGHr]
("[O]vcr halr of the student population at proprietary schools is eon1prised or 'nontraditional' students, such as students who are 25 years old and older.").
14. See Linehan, supra note 7, at 756 ("!viost [proprietary school] enrollees ... have
previously experienced educational failure.").
15. See Anti-Fraud !iemings, suj1m note 10, at 22 (statement of Rep. 1.-Iaxinc 'Vaters)
(arguing that victims or proprietary schools' misrepresentations "arc less likely to eon1plain,
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Sin1ilarly, these characteristics put these individuals at higher risks of
dropping out before progran1 con1plction and eventually defaulting on
student loans. 1r; The costs of higher education failure arc high; therefore,
the costs of higher education 1nisrcprcscntations arc high. Unfortunately,
taxpaycrs 1 in addition to the victin1s, arc saddled \Vith these costs. 17 .~s a
result, effective oversight of higher education n1arkcting and rccruitn1cnt
\vould not only protect individual students, but also cont1ibutc to the
country's fiscal health.
In n1aking the case for better oversight, this 1\rticlc describes, in Part I,
the 1nultifacctcd nature of higher education n1isrepresentations and fraud.
Part II discusses the con1n1oditization of higher education. Part III
chronicles the rise of proprietary colleges and describes their aggressive
inarketing and rccruitn1cnt practices. Part IV argues that an i1npcrative
exists for tighter regulation of higher education n1arketing and recruitn1cnt.
Part\! asserts that current safeguards arc inadequate in protecting students
and taxpayers fron1 n1isrcpresentations. Lastly, Part VI presents proposals
for regulating higher education representations in a manner that protects
the public from n1isrcprcscntations \vithout unduly restricting con1pctition
and protected speech.

I.

HIGHER EDGCATIO:'\ MISREPRESE:'\TATIO:\!S A:'iD FRAGD

\\Then 60 1Vfi11ules visited can1puscs of the I(atharinc Gibbs SchooJ rn and
Brooks Collegc 1 ~ 1 to investigate proprietary school business practices, the
and when they do they arc less cffccti\·c, because they don't know where to con1plain, or
how to articulate their con1plaint, as they do not know 1hc rcquirc1nents of the law'').
J 6.
GAO, STRO'\GER O\'ERSJGHT, .rnjJm notc 13, al 19-20.
l 7. Id. at 12 ("\Vhen students do not 1nakc pay1ncnts on their !Cdcral loans and the
loans arc in default, the ltdcral go\·errnncn1 and taxpayers assun1e nearly all .the risk and arc
left with the costs.").
IH. l(atha1inc Gibbs School consisted of t\\·o ca1npuscs in l\cw York and one in
Pennsylvania that were owned by Career Education Corporation (CEC). After an
unsuccessful atte1npt lo sell the can1puses, CEC announced on February 15, 2008, that il
would close one of its J(atha1inc Gibbs ran1puses and converl the other to another brand
within its co1voration. Press Release, Career Educ. Corp., Career Education Co1voration
Announces Plans to Teach-Out Progrctn1s at Selected Schools 1-Icld for Sale (Feb. 15, 2008),
ht tp: / / p hx. corpora te-ir.ne l/ phoenix.zh tn11? c::: 8 73 90&p::: iroln ewsArticlc_print&JD::: 11088 l l&highligh1::: [hereinafter CEC, Teach-Out].
19. Brooks College consisted of two can1puses in California that were owned by CEC.
Press Release, Career Educ. Corp., Career Education Corporation Announces Plans !Or
Strategic J)ivcstitures of Selected Schools (No\'. 15, 2006), http://media.corporateir.net/ n1cdia_files/irol/ 8 7/ 8 7390/ CECSchoo!SalcsandClosingPrcssReleasewithExhibits 11
1506.pdf Q1creinafter CEC, Divestitures]. After an unsuccessful atte1npt to sell the
campuses, CEC announced on June 28, 2007, that it would be closing both Brooks
ca1npuses. CEC, Teach-Out, supra nolc 18.
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producers found a virtual treasure trove of corruption. In its feature, ForPrefzt Colle,_f!,e: G'ost{v Lesson) the nc•vsn1agazinc docun1cntcd recruiter
1nisrcprcscntations and entrance cxan1 in1proprictics, providing insider
vic,vs into the high pressure \Vorld of proprietary school rccruiting2° and the
debilitating effects of unscrupulous rccruit1ncnt tactics.21 These tactics have
dra\vn the ire of forn1cr students, policyn1akcrs, govcrnn1cntal regulators,
and consurncr \Vatchdogs, and have forn1cd the bases of lav1'suits,
investigations, and congressional hearings. Proprietary schools, for all of
their virtues,'.!'.! have a checkered collective past. 2:-; ~rhe rate of investigations
and sanctioning an1ong the sector exceeds that of the nonprofit sector. '.l-lAnd even though corruption has been greatly reduced since the 1980s and
early 1990s, proprietary schools arc still tainted by in1proprieties that n1any
believe arc the direct result of their tuition-driven, profit-generating
niotivcs. '.ls

20. Rebecca Leung, For-Prqjit College: Cosily Leswn, 60 I\IJNUTES, Jan. 30, 2005,
hup:/ /\vww.cbsncws.co1n/stories/2005/0 l /31 /60n1inutcs/nu1in670'179.shunl
("The
adn1ission counselors told 60 J\1inulc.\ they were expected to enroll three high school
graduates a week, regardless of their ability to con1plete the coursework. And if they didn't
meet those quotas, they were out of a job .
They all say the pressure produced so1nc
very aggressive sales tactics.").
21. See id. (intcn·iewing uncn1ploycd and underen1ploycd g1·aduates of Brooks College
who stated that achnission counselors induced their enrolln1enl with prmnises of prcstiglous
n11ployn1cnt in the fashion industry upon graduation).
22. See C.S. (;E:'\. i-\CCOL:.'\Tl:\G 0FFJCE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, PROPRIET:\RY
SCHOOLS: :r-vf!J,LIO.\"S SPENT TO TRAL'\ STUDEi\'TS FOR OvERSL:Pl'LJED Occt:PATIONS 5
(1997), available al hup:/ /www.gao.gov/archivc/ 1997 /he97 l 04.pdC Q1ercinaficr GAO,
0\'ERSLPPl.JED Oc:c:L;P.--\TJO.\S] ("Proprietary schools contribute to the nation's
cmnpetitivcncss by providing occupational training to traditionally noncollcg-c-bound
individuals.'').
23. See LIS:\ K_. FOSTER, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, CH.B 04-010, FoR-PROF!T
POSTSECONDARY EDL'.C.--\TION.--\1. l:\STITLTJONS: OvER\'JEW OF 1\CCRJ·:nrr.--\TJO!\" t\J~D
STATE AND FEDER.--\1. OVERSIGHT 14- (2004-) ("During the 1970s and 80s, institutions
operated with little or no oversight and !Cw constraints in recruiting and training students. A
large nun1bcr or institutions did not provide the training advertised, did not co1nply with fair
consu1ner practices, and 1nis1nanaged finances.").
2'1-. See Linehan, .wjna note 7, at 760 ("[A]lthough proprietary schools con1posc onethird of the approxin1atcly 6,000 schools eligible for federal student grants and loans, they
recently accounted for three-fourths of the Deparlinent [of Education]'s student loan fraud
and abuse investigations.").
25. See Catherine Elton, J)egrees q1· Djfjicully: The Tiuth About Online [Jniver.iilies,
COXSUi\·lERS DIG., 1vlar./Apr. 2009, at 20-21 (describing "a disturbing pattern" of
aggressive recruiting tactics by for-profit schools that ensnare unqualified students who
ultimately ri1il out or qualified studcnL'\ who receive little benefit fro111 the noncompetitive
lcan1ing environment).
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A. bfflnted Placemen! and Completion Rates
Proprietary school misrepresentations and other in1proprictics cost
individual students and taxpayers. l'vlisrcprcscntations typically pertain to
job placcn1cnt rates, a bcnchn1ark upon \Vhich proprietary schools n1arkct
thcn1sclvcs.26 These rates can be n1isrcprcscntcd in tcrn1s of the nu1nbcr of
students placed, the average salary offered by those placcn1cnts, and the
overall availability of quality placcn1cnts.'.! 7 A._ prerequisite to placcn1cnt,
con1plction rates arc often n1isrcprcscntccPB or not clisclosccl as rcquircd.2' 1
A con1n1011 scenario is one experienced by the 60 1'1inules producer \vho
posed as a prospective student. She \Vas told by a I<..atharine Gibbs

representative that the school\ placen1ent rate \Vas 89°/o; ho\vever,
Deparnnent of Education (DOE) data put the rate at 29°;;i.:~o A forn1er
Brooks recruiter captured the integrated nature of placc1ncnt and
con1pletion rate misrepresentations \vhen she sun11narizecl the essential
elcn1cnts of her deceptive sales pitch: "\'\! c arc telling you that you arc going
to have a 95 percent [chance of getting] a job paying S35,000 to 54·0,000 a
year by the tin1c you arc done in 18 n1011ths.":-11 Proprietary schools have

26. See Linehan, .mjJH1 nolc 7, al 757 {discussing how prop1ictary schools place
"advc1tisc1nents on dayli1nc and late night television lo reach the uncn1ployed and those
seeking new jobs"); see aLw FOSTER, supra nolc 23, at 12 (describing placement rates as "[t]hc
ultimate outcon1c 111easurc").
27. See 1111ti-Fra11d llearingJ, .wpm note 10, at 15 (statc111en1 or IZcp. i\Jaxinc \\';llcrs)
("The biggest 1nisrcprcscntations n1ack lo students that con\·ince thc111 to enroll arc
anticipated starting -.-salary ... and the place1nent rate.
The starting sala1ics that
prospecti\'c students arc told arc scldorn true. l'dany schools tout a 90°/o plus placcn1cnt
rate. But these arc sclfrcportccl rates and not necessarily accurate."); see alw Linehan, supra
note 7, at 759 (discussing the pressure that oversupplied labor n1arkets place on proprictar:schools); "C.S. GE'\. A.CCOL'.'\Tl'\G Ol'JIJCE, GAO/T-HEHS-96-JSfl, I-IJGl-!ER EnL.:c.-\TIO'\:
E'\sL:Rl'\G QL:ALJTY EDL:CxrJO:\ FRO:\] PROPRJl·:TARY l.\ST!TLTIO.\S l l-12 (1996),
Ll1creinaftcr GA.O, E.'\SL;Ill~G QUALITY] (statcn1ent or Cornelia l\J. Blanchette), available 111
hup:/ /www.gao.gov/archivc/ I 996/he96 I 58L.pdf (discussing the financial ra1nifications of
students incuniug debt in order to train IOr jobs for which little de1nand exists). But rj."
GAO, OVERSLPPL!ED OCCUPATIONS, supra note 22, at 11 (discussing bcncfils con!Crrcd
upon students who trained in oversupplied fields).
28. See, e.g., Leung, supra note 20 (reporting that reprcscntali\'es from the K.atha1ine
Gibbs School in ~cw York lied about the school's gTacluation rate).
29. See DE.--\I'\'\E LOONIK & Jt..:L!A DEV,\J.~TH1::RY. Xxr'L CO.'\SU.\IER LAW CTR.,
i\J.--\KL.\G THE .>JU;'dBERS COt.::\T: \VHY PROPRIETARY SCHOOL PERFOR:'d.--\'\C:E DATA
DOESN'T ADD UP AND \VHAT CA:'J BE DONE ABOl.'.T IT 27-31 (2005), available al
ht lp: I I \V\VW. st udcn tloanborrowcrassistance. org/ uploads /Filc/ProprietarySchoolsReport .pd
r (describing the difficulty of obtaining completion data directly frorn proprietary schools
included in ils investigation).
30. Leung, ;,upra note 20.
31. A11ti-Fraudlleari11gJ,.mpm note IO, at 8-9.
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also been accused of n1isrcprcscnting the transferability of crcdits,::i~
progra1nn1atic content,:-;:-; and accreditation status.:H
In addition,
shareholders of publicly-traded schools have filed la.vsuits alleging
n1isrcprcscntations and on1issions in annual reports and other required
disclosures. ·5.")

B. Inappropriate Con1pensatio11 Arrangenzenfs
ln1proprictics also involve the fraudulent obtaining of Title l\l financial
aid fr1nds. ~)(i 1'his fraud tends to be systc111atic in nature and often concerns
the manner in \vhich recruiters arc co1npcnsatccl, the process by \vhich
students arc enrolled and n1atriculatcd, and the n1anipulation of regulatory
safeguards. Recruiter compensation is a frequent basis of la,-vsuits against
proprietary schools. Title IV forbids schools fron1 con1pensating rectuiters
based solely on the nun1ber of students they induce to enroll.:~;- This ban on
"incentive con1pensation" is intended to protect students by lessening the
pressure on recruiters to induce enrollment at all costs.:rn The National

32. See, e.g., ~fill v. Delta Sch. ofCon1n1e1-cc, Inc., 487 So. 2d 180, 182 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (alie~ng a breach or contract for SC\"CTal 1nisreprescntations the school used to induce
plaintiff to enroll, including the ability to transfer credits to other institu1ions).
3'.~. See, e.g., Phillips Coils. of Ala., Inc. v. Lester, 622 So. 2d 308, 309 (Ala. 1993)
(alleging that the school misrepresented the nature of its instruction).
34. SC(', e.g., 1'dalone \" ..~\cad. or Court Reporting, .182 ::'\.E.2d 5+, 55-5() (Ohio Ct.
App. l 990) (suing for false clain1s of accreditation).
35. See_, e.g., lJoug Ledcnnan,}11~:.r Orr/enc: ef Phoenix Parent lo Pr!J' S277 Jiiliion, l."<SJDE
HIGHER ED, Jan. 17, 2008, http:/ /www.insidchighercd.corn/nc11·s/2008/0 l I 17/apollo
(discussiJJg a large dan1agcs award issued againsl the Gnivcrsity of PhoPnix f(ll" failing to
disclose a critical Department of Education [DOE] report in a filing \\·ith the Securities and
Exchange Con1111ission).
36. Titk I\·' of the Higher Education Act go\·crns the provision of !Cderal financial aid
funds Cor higher education. "fhe statute governs n1ostly need-based prognuns, such as
Federal Pell Grants, supplcn1cntal educational opportunity grants, pay111cnts to the States
and institutions for need-based financial aid, and other special progra1ns and prqjec1s. 20
l:.S.C. ~ 1070(a) (2006).
37. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i) (2009) (requiring that ''an institution agTccs
that ... [i]t will not provide any con1111ission, bonus, or other incentive payn1ent based
directly or indirecily upon success in sccu1ing cnrol11ncnls or financial aid to any person or
entity engaged in any student recruiting or adn1ission activities. ."). But ser: id.
§ 668. l 4(b)(22)(ii) (listing exceptions to this prohibitioJJ).
38. 11.R. I 992, 17ie Internet Equity and Education Act ef 2001: ]fearing Before lhe Suhwmm. on
2 I st Century Competitiveness ef !lie 11 Comm. on Education and the f1.7orlforcc, l 07th Cong. 1+(200 I)
(staten1cnt of Lo1Tainc Lewis, IJJspector General of the United Stales), available al
http:/ /fi>vebgate.access.gpo.gov I cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbna1ne::: I 07 _house_hcarings&docid:::
1:77908.pdf ("The prohibition was designed lo protect students from the high pressure tactics
used by recruiters to enroll students in progran1s for which they n1ay not have been prepared
or did not want. "fhe students were saddled with 1rnwanted debt at increased cost to the
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l\ssociation for College Adn1ission Counseling (NACAC) argues that
"reducing the basis for compensation to the number of students enrolled in
any circun1stancc introduces an incentive for recruiters to actively ig11orc
the student interest in the transition to postsecondary education. "39 In spite
of this ban, accusations against proprietary school con1pcnsation structures
abound: 111 In a 2003 audit, the DOE found that the University of Phoenix
(UOP)-11 had violated the ban: 12 The audit described a systcn1 under 'vhich
recruiter con1pcnsa6on \Vas tied to "asses in classcs".t:J and a culture 'vhcrc a
recruiter's cnrolln1cnt nun1bcrs could mean the difference benveen
lucrative en1ployn1entl--l- and uncn1ployn1ent.~.S According to the DOE, the
high pressure cnvironn1ent fostered by UOP's con1pensation structure led
to the very dangers that the ban is intended to prevent. Unqualified
students and those facing unfavorable fan1ily or financial circumstances
vvere pressured to enroll. -Hi Recruiters also pressured students to take out
loans to pay tuition,+7 and recruiters vverc encouraged to cease providing
taxpayers.").
39. ::\Xr'L .A.ss'x FOR COLI .. An.\HSSJO:'\ COC?\SELING, TEST!.\IONY OF THE l'\ATIO:\"AL
AsSOCJATJO?\ FOR COLI.EGE ADl\IJSSIO:\" COU:\"SELJXG (XACt\C): I·IJGHER EDUCATJO:\' AGr
ST.-\TL:ToRY B.--\:\" O'.\' J:\"CENTJVE Co.\JPE:\SATION FOR An:o.HSSION A?\D F1.'\ANCl.-\L A.in
OFFICERS
1-2
(2009),
available al hup://www.nacacnet.org/Legislali\'cAction/
Legislati vc :'\"C\ vs/Doeun1cn ts IN A CA CTestimonyl nccnli vcC on1pensatio n. pdf [hcrcinaft er
~ACAC "fF.STL\JO:\V] (discussing the ban in ten11s of the "infonnation asynunetrl' tha!
exists between recruiters and prospective studtnls).
40. See, e.g., LOO:'\I.'\ & DE\'A:\THt'.:RY, rnpm note 29, al I (sununarizing these
accusations).
'}l. Cnivcrsity of Phoenix (COP) is "the nation's largest piivatc uni\'trsiLy, offering
unckrgraduatc and gTaduate degree prog1«1n1s at 1nore than 200 locations, as well as onlinc
1n n1o~t countrlcs around the world."
l'.ni,•crsity of Photnix, History,
ht lp:/ ;,,.,v,1· .phoenix.eclu/ about_us/ about_univcrsity_o[_phoenix/ history.hl111l (last visi1 eel
i\ug. '.), 20 l 0).
'12. "C.S. DEr'T OF Ence., PRCX 20034-0922254, PROGR.--\).J RE\"!E\\" R1·:PORT:
t_:_'\l\'ERSITY OF PHOE.'\lX 7-8 (2004), m.milable at http://s3.a1nazonaws.co1n/propublica/
asscts/highcr-cd/doe_rcport_uop.pdf Q1ereinafter "COP PROGR:\:O,.I R_E\'IE\\" REPOR"l].
43. 1'he audit also referenced "butts in seats." Id. at lO.
44. See, e.g., id. al 7-8 (listing a salary schedule showing that UOP recruiters could 111akc
upwards of $120,000 per year and discussing how the potential for high salaries often
pro1npled en1ployccs in other departmenl~ lo seek recruiter positions).
'}5. Id. at 12 (quoting a UOP enrolln1enl director saying in a recruiter 1nceting: "f\lly job
is on the line. And I need you guys to perform. . . if you're not doing your job, you're going
to lose your job. And if you're not hitting your goals, that's how we're going to measure if
you're doing the job. And ... I don't inean applications in. I mean starts.").
4-6. Even when recruiters felt other educational options, such as eom1nunity collcg-cs,
would be better for individual prospects, they were forbidden from 1naking such
rccon11nendations. Id. at 24.
47. Recruiters were expected to eon1plete financial aid documentation for students, and
the forging of signatures by recruiters was commonplace. Id. al 25; see afro Anti-Fraud
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support to these students once their enrollment \vas credited for salary
purposcs.-rn UOP ended up paying $9.8 n1illion to settle the investigation
but ad111ittcd no \vrongcloing.-l-'1
The issue of incentive con1pcnsation has spa\vncd a spate of}a,vsuits filed
pursuant to the federal False Clain1s f\ct (.l<""CA).-"'O The qui tani-"'1 pro\isions
of the Act pcrn1it p1i\'atc citizens to bring la\vsuits alleging ffaud against the
govcrn111cnt on behalf of the govcrnn1cnt ..'i'! If the plaintif1S, referred to as
rclators, arc successful in \Vinning dan1agcs on behalf of the govcrnn1cnt,
they share in the rccO\'cry.·1:l The la\v is intended to inccntivizc \Vhistlcblo-,ving by indi,iduals \Vith first-hand kno\vledgc of fraud against the

govcn1n1ent.·1·1

Proprietary schools arc particularly susceptible to FCi\

lleari11gs, j1tpm note 10, at 41 {sta1c1ncnt of Paula L. Dorsey, forn1er J)ircctor of Admissions,
Bryn1an College) (discussing recruiters pressuring students to "in1properly obtain social
security nun1bers and signatures of other !~u11ily 1nen1bers by whatever 1neans necessary for
the hopes of getting a 'bcucr' financial aid package").
48. See t:Qp PROGRA.\I RE\"JE\\' REPORT, .rnj;ra nolc ,J.2, at 24 (illustrating how, to be
considered enrolled for pu1voscs or calculating recruiter sala1y, sttidents had to ''attend three
nights of the first five-week course of" a bachelors' prograin or, for gTacluate students, au end
two nights ... and be scheduled to attend a second class. After the student has n1et these
ciitcria ... LOP requires [recruiters] to pursue new cnroJbnenls .... ").
49. See Apollo Group, Inc., The February 2004 Prognun Review Report R.clating to
the University of Phoenix was fundainentally Flawed, http:/ /www.apollolegal.cozn/
prrCritiquc.htn1! (last visited .July 31, 2010) i''[\\]c l>dicvc thal the tcrn1s of the Scttlc1ncnt
.-\grcen1ent between GOP and [the DO El constitute a clear, albeit iznplicil, njcction of the
[audit] and its alleged findings. The si1npk fact is that if the alleged findings in the [audit]
had any 111erit-which they do not-[thc IJ()E] would not and could not ha\"C settled the
issues raised in the [audit] on the tcnns that it did. The 1ern1s of the Seulc1nc11t Agrec1nent
arc very fa,·orabk: to l'.OP.").
JO. See, e.g., l~in1othy J. Hatch & Bryan Arnold, 77ze Growing "Threat ef False-Claim.\
Luu.mils, CHRO.\. HIGHER EnL:c.
.July
14, 2006, at
BIG, rwailah!e at
http:/ /chronicle.con1/artide/Thc-Gro,,·ing-Thrca1-o('..Falsc/ I 0310/ (desnibing a recent
Sc\"Cnth Circuit decision allowing a plaintiff to bring a clai1n under the False Clain1s A.ct
(FCA) against a pri\'ate school).
51. "Qi.ti lam is short f(ir the Latin phrase . . ·who pursues this action on our Lord the
K.ing's behalf as well as his own."' \'t. Agcnc~ of :'\atura] Res. \'. Cnitcd States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 V.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).
52. 31 L'.S.C. ~ 3730(b)(l) (2006) ("A. person n1ay b1ing a civil action for a violation or
section 3729 for the person and for the l~nitecl States Governn1cnt. The action shall be
brought in the name of the Governn1enL.").
53. Defendants found to ha\"C con1n1itted fraud under the FCA arc assessed a fine
ranging from $5,000 lo $10,000 and n1usl pay three 1in1es the govenunent\ da1nagcs arising
fron1 the fraud. § 3729{a)(7). Plaintiffs can reco\'er between 2.5°10 and 30°10 of the laucr
assess1nent. Id.§ 3730(d){2).
34·. See, e.g., Constitutionality of the Qui Ta1n Provisions of the False Clai1ns Act, 109
Op. Alt'y Gen. 4~5 (1989) (staling that the 1986 i\1nend1ncnts to the FCA were the result of
Congress being "dissatisfied with the way the cxecuti\'e branch was enforcing govcn11nent
procurcn1cnt laws" and therefore desiring to "'deputize' private citizens to ensure effective
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Ja,vsuits; 33 plaintiff<> have filed n1any Ja,vsuits allcglng fraud in the
obtainn1cnt of 'l'itlc IV funds, prin1arily ansing fron1 recruiter
con1pcnsation arrangcn1cnts. 5li FCA actions of this type have proved
fi·uitful. In 2007, Oakland City University paid $5.3 n1illion to settle such a
la\vsuit.5 7 In late 2009, UOP settled an FCA suit for aln1ost $80 million.·?8
In both cases, the \vhistlc-blo1vcrs rcccivccl n1illions of dollars for their
efforts.

C.

Entrance 1fsL ln1/1roprieties

Proprietary schools have also faced accusations of in1proprictics relating
to the cnrolln1cnt of ineligible students for financial aid purposes. Entrance
test in1proprictics and the falsification of attendance records commonly
forn1 the bases of these accusations. For federal financial aid pu1poses,
students not possessing a high school diplon1a or General Equivalency
Diploma (GED) nlust take and pass "an independently acln1inistcrcd test of
basic n1ath and English skills, called an 'ability-to-benefit' or ATB test. The
intent of the test is to measure \Vhethcr students have the basic skills needed
to benefit fron1 higher education and succeed in school. ".J~l An investigation
by the Governn1ent Accountability Office (GAO) clocun1ented test
adn1inistrators giving out ans,vers and changing ans,vers to ensure passing
scores. 60 At the }Catharine Gibbs School, the 60 ;\!Jinuies producer
intentionally failed the entrance exan1, but \·Vas allovvcd to retake it and vvas
told her second score \vas sufficient for adn1ission purposes_(il Additionally,
law cnforccn1c11t'').
55. See Sara Hebel, Sujitnne Comt Blocks Suill .·lgaim·/ P11bfir Colleges [.'J1der
T+71frtleBlower l..i1W, CHROX. I·JJGHt~R Enl;c., June 2, 2000, at A'.18, auaiiabie al
http:/ /chroniclc.c01n/articlc/Supre1nc-Court-Blocks-S11its-/35 l 30/ (detailing ho\v pr:iYa!c
individuals arc barred fron1 suing public, bu1 not private, colleges).
56. See genna!fr I-latch & Arnold, .wpm note 50, at B 16 (providing an overview or FCA
lawsuits brought against educational institutions).
57. Elizabeth Quill, [J11iz,,0;1i!J• H'ill P(!Y S5.3-J1iilion lo ,)'ettle f.Vlu:>tfe-Blowcr'!J Lt1ws11it,
CHRO~.
HIGHER
Ent:C.,
Aug.
40,
2007,
at
A20,
available
al
http: I I chronicle. con1 I article /lJ ni \ -crsi t y- \Viii-Pa y-5 3-JVIi/ 5144 /.
58. Press Release, Apollo Group, Inc., Apollo Group, Inc. Resolves lJnivcrsity of
Phoenix False
Clain1s Acl Case (Dec.
14,
2009),
http:/ /plLx.cOI'f)Oratcir.net/phocnix.zhtn11?c:::79624&p:::irol-newsA.rlicle&ID::: 1365655 ("lJndcr the teims of the
agrce1nent, lhc Co111pany will pay $67 .5 1nillion to the United Stales. A separatc agree1nenl
provides for the payinenl by the Co1npany of$J l 1nillion in altorncys fees to the plaintiffa, as
required by the False Clai1ns Act.").
59. Gf\0, STRONGER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, al 9.
60. Id. al 22.
61. Her initial score was seven oul of fifty. Upon retaking the test, the admissions
recruiter said she got fourteen out or fifty answers correct, which was sufficient for
enrollment. Leung, supra note 20.

c:s.
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recruiters alleged that schools forced thcn1 to enroll students even \Vithout
required exam scorcs.(;2 J\ federal raid in 2004 of the headquarters of ITT
Educational Services (ITT)<i:l and ten of its can1puscs is believed to have
been related to allegations that the proprictaiy educational provider \vas
overstating student cnrolln1cnt in order to increase its federal financial aid
rcvcnuc.G-l- The investigation found no \vrongcloing an1ong executives
\vithin the con1pany;(i 5 ho\vcvcT, investigations of individual can1puscs
rcn1aincd opcn. 1ifi

D. C'o/wrt DrjO.uli Rate j_\1a1u/JulaLion
Schools arc con1n1only accused of n1anipulating cohort default ratcs.i. 1
Cohort default rates provide schools ,.vith incentives to 111inin1izc defaults
62. See Anti-Fraud llearing!J, .\llpra note I0, al 'ii (slaten1enL of Paula L. Dorsey, forn1cT
Director of A.dn1issions, Bry1nan College) (''There were students that had never taken the
exains or who had Jailed the exan1s, sining in class. I was instructed to dean up the !ilcs by
whatever 1neans necessary even if it nleanl backdating things.").
63. Sec ITT Educational
Services, Inc., Investor Relations Overview,
hllp: I /,vww .iucsi.con1/phoenix.zhtn11?c::::94519&p::::irol-IRI-lo1ne
("ITT
Education a!
Services, Inc. ... provides accredited, technology-or:ientcd undergraduate and gTadualc
degree progra1ns ... to help students develop skills and knowledge they need to pursue
career opportunities in a variety of fields. It owns and operates n1orc· than I 20 ITT
Technical Institutes and Daniel \Vcbster College. [ltj serves approxi111atcly B0,000 students
at ils can1puses in 38 states and online.").
64. &~c Press Release, IT'T Educational Scrvices, Inc., 1Tf Educational Services, Inc.
Reports that It Has Been Served with a SC'arch \Varranl and IZdatcd Subpoenas fro1n the
t:.S. District Court 111 Texas (Feb. 25, 2004),
http://www.ittcsi.con1/
phoenix.zhln1l?c::::94519&p::::irol-nc\vsA.rtick&ID::::,J.9fl922&highlight::::
(reporting
Lhal
agents sought infonnation pertaining to "phtcen1ent figures and rates, retention figt11Ts and
rates, graduation figures and rates, attendance figures and rates, rccrui11ncnt and adn1issions
rnalerials, student grades, graduate salaries[,] and transferability or credits 10 other
institutjons'').
65. Press R.clease, ITI' Educational Services, Inc., IT1' Educational Scn·ices, Inc. :'\o
Longer Sul~ject of L'.S. Dcpart111cnl of .Justice ln\'cstigation LJunc 2 J., 2005),
http:/ I www .ittesi.con1/ phoenix:,:htn11?c::::94-:l l 9&p:::irol-news1\rtide&JD:::: 7237 75
&highlight::::; sec alro LeLter fro1n Chuck Rosenberg, t:.S. Attorney, to 1'hon1as E. Holliday &
Lawrence
D.
Finder
LJunc
24,
2005),
hup://1nedia.c01voratcir.net/1nedia_lilcs/I\I'"S/ESI/DOJLet.pdf (inConning counsel !Or ITT that the L".S.
J-\.ttorney's investigation "has not revealed evidence sufficient" lo find wrongdoing on the
parts of con1pany executives).
66. John L. Pulley, Justice Dejxirlment Ends lnqnio' into !IT Educational Sernices, CHRO:\.
HIGHER EDUC., July 8, 2005, at A23, available al http://chronicle.co1n/artide/JusticeDeparL111ent-Ends-Inq/7707 /.
67. See GAO, STRONGER OVERSJGHT, :.upra note 13, at JO ("[DOE] con1putes default
rates for all schools with students who receive Title IV loans ... by tracking whether
borrowers in a cohort-a group of students who begin repaying their loans in a given fiscaJ
year-at each school default on their federal student loans over a 2-year period.").
1
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an1ong their stuclcnt-borro\vcrs and protect taxpayers fron1 the costs of
excessive dcfaults. 6!l
Schools \·vith default rates that exceed certain
thresholds can have their federal financial aid eligibility stripped. G•)
I-Iistorically, proprietary schools have recorded higher default rates than
nonprofit institutions, 70 and nun1crous proprietary schools have been closed
due to unacceptably high ratcs. 71 Given the extent to \\'hich proprietary
schools rely on 'I'itlc l\l aid, losing eligibility is akin to an institutional death
sentence. I'!.
In an effort to reduce cohort default rates, son1c prop1ictary schools
unilaterally pay off loans obtained by students \vho later \vithdn1,v. 7:l \.Vhile
this niay seen1 altruistic on its face, the true n1otivation is thus: Students
\vho take out loans to pay for school 1 but \Yithclra\v before co1nplcting an
acaden1ic progran1 1 arc at high risk of defaulting on those loans;7-t therefore,
schools settle the loans for these students as a n1cans of protecting their
Title IV eligibilit) fron1 likely defaults. 7:1 The schools then engage in
aggressive efforts to collect the debt fron1 students, offering less favorable
repayment tern1s than those available through Title IV. 7fi As a result 1
forn1er students have brought la\vsuits alleging contract-based causes of
action.7 7
1

68. ''Defaulted kderal student loans cosl l<L"Xpayers 111oney. Cohort default rate
sanctions and benefits proyicJe an inccnti\'c to schools to work with their borrowers to reduce
dcfauh.
[C]ohon default rates help sa\'C ta.... paycrs n1oncy." C.S. DEP'T OF EnL:c.
COHORT DEFA.Ll,'J" Rxn: GL:JDE, 2.4-1 (2006), hllp://iLlp.cd.go,·/Dcfauhl\1anagcn1t'nt/
guidc/at1achnwnts/CDRGuicle:l\JasterSept06.pdC
69. Schools with dcfallh ralcs of 25°/o or abo\·c for thi:ee years or abo\'e '1-0°/o for one
year lose kckral student loan eligibility /Or the rcn1aindcr of the year after notification and
for the subsequent two years. pending appeals and af\jllsl1ncnts. See id. at 2.4-2 to -3
(discussing benefits con!"Crrcd upon schools with default rates ofkss than 5°/o or 10°/n).
70. G:\O, STRO>:GER ()\"l·J(S!GHT, supra note 13, al l '.1, I 5- I 7.
71. Sa, 1'.g., Linehan, .rn/Hr1 nole 7, at 760 (noting that the closures have resulted fro1n
"fraudulent inisreprcscntations and deceptive 1narketing'').
72. Id. But Jee Justin Pope, AP L\IPACT· For-Prqjit Colf1g1's Boos! Lending, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug.14, 2009. auailab/e at http://abcnews.go.co1n/CS/wircStory?icl:::833000 I
(detailing increased loan inaking by prop1ictary schools to financially strapped students,
111any of who1n would not quali!\· for traditional student loans).
73. Sre, e.g., Doug Ledennan, l/1111.rna/ (and lmprope1) l'Vfi)' to !.JJwer f)ef(w!t Raffj, l>:SJDE
l-l!Gl·IER
ED,
1viay
21,
2008,
hup:/ /www.insidchighered.co111/layout/sct/print
/news/2008/05/21 I default (discussing the particularities of TIT's lending practices and
their negative i1npact on students).
74. See, e.g., GAO, STRO>:GER 0\'ERSJGHT, .wpm note 13, at 20 (providing an overview
of six dilTercnt research studies that showcase trends in students' default rates).
75. Ledern1an, supra note 7'.1.
76. Id.
77. See ~A.CAC TESTL\!O~Y, .mpm note 39, at !6 (sununarizing a lawsuit against lJOP
filed by fonncr students whose loans were paid by lJOP without their pern1ission).
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The DOE has expressed disapproval of this behavior. In 2008, an
inspector for the DOE found that a proprietary school in Nc\v York had
in1propcrly repaid Title IV loans or returned loan funds for 30 l students
\vho \YithdrC\\' during their first scn1cstcr of study. 7B School officials stated
that this "default prevention polic~/' \Vas in1plc1ncntcd due to past problcn1s
\vith the school's default rate. 7 ~ 1 As a result of its findings, the DOE n1aclc
various rccon1n1cndations to the school, including ceasing the practice of
repaying loans and ending pending collection efforts resulting fron1 that
practice.Ho

Proprietary school misrepresentations and i1nproprictics arc n1ultifacctcd
and costly. I-Jo,vcvcr, for 111any of these institutions, their profit-generating
n1otives n1ake the allure of such beha,~ors irresistible. These n1otivcs arc
part of a larger trend of con1n1o<litization of higher education.
Con1n1oditization has introduced a n1arkct ethos into higher education that
has changed the \Vay all institutions operate-for better and \Vorse.
II. THE COMMODITIZATIO'; OF HIGHER Em;cATJON

The United States has the 1nost market-oriented systen1 of higher
education in the \vorld.H 1 Con1parcc\ to its European counterparts, the
A1nerican systen1 has developed \vith little direct influence from the federal
governn1ent. B2
This frcedon1 has spa\.vned a vast, entrepreneurial
expansion of higher education \.vi thin the United Statcs.B.1 '"'fhrough 111uch
of the country's history, new colleges vvere established '\vithout restraint," 84
and the result has been a proliferation and clen1ocratization of higher

78.

l_;.s. Dl·:P'T OF EDl_:c ., OFFICE 01' l\Sf'ECTOR GE\"., ED-OIG/A02H0007, Fl:'\AL

At:DIT REPORT: TECH:'\'JC:\L CAREER l\"STlTl""rt~S, l.\'C.'S AD,\!l~JSTR:\TIO'\ OF THE

FEDERAL PELL (;R.-\\"T A'.\'D fEDER.-\L f.-\,\llL'li EDL:CATIO:'\ LOA\" PROGRA:.JS '.i (2008).
hup:/ /\-V\vw2 .ed. go\·/ about/ offices/list/ oig/ auditreports/ fy200B/ a02h0007 .pdf.
79. Id. at 4-.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., J);;n·id D. Dill, Ailmving the 1'1aiket to Rule: 17ie Cme q/lhe United Stales. 57
HIGHER EDCC. Q !36, 137 (2003) (discussing the increased "1narketization" of higher
education and its i1npact 011 the public interest).
82. See, e.g., 1viartin Trow, Federalism in Ameri(an Iligher Education, in HIGHER LEAR!\I\"G
IN A\IERlCA: l 980-2000 39, 39 (Arthur Levine ed., 1993) (observing the n1ini1nal direct
influence of the kdcral govern1nent on the United States' higher education syslen1). But see,
e.g., Lawrence E. Gladicux &Jacqueline E. King, 171e Federal Gouernmenl And lligher Ed11calio11,
in A\IERIC.Ac"i HIGHER EDUC.-\TIO;\ I;\ THE T\.\'ENTY-Fm..s-r CENTURY 151, 15! (Philip G.
A.ltbach, Robert 0. Berdahl & Patricia J. Gun1port eds., 1999) (arguing that federal
influence has been pe1vasive).
83. See, e.g., CHRISTOPl-IERj. LUCAS, Ai\IERICAN HJGHER EDUCATION 116~ 19 (2006)
(discussing lhe proliferation of colleges in the early Lo 1nid-ninetcenlh century United Stales).
811-. Id. at 117.
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education that stand in contrast to the elitist systcn1s in Europe and other
parts of the \vorld. 8·1 Historically, ho,vcvcr, the higher education n1arkct
has been largely protected fron1 the sink-or-s\vin1 pressures that have
characterized other industries. I-Iighcr education has enjoyed strong public
support, and vast sun1s of public resources have flovvcd \Vith '~rtually no
strings attachccl. 86 Ho,vcvcr, various cconon1ic and social trends have led
to a clin1inishn1cnt of higher education's protected n1arkct standing, and as
a result, a capitalistic acadcn1ic systcn1 has conic to the f0rc.H 1
1~hc
con1n1oditization of higher education is a transcendent
phenomenon. This n1ultifaceted trend is the result of n1any interrelated
factors, including de111ands of the kno\vledgc-based econon1y, ne\v
technologies, increased globalization, ncoliberal financial aid policies,
changing student populations, rising tuition, clen1ands for accountability,
and the advent of ne\v higher education pro\.iclcrs.
One result of
con1111oditization is a higher education n1arkct rooted in capitalistic
principles; thus, any discussion of the factors contributing to
comn1oclitization n1ust begin \vith a discussion of acadcn1ic capitalisn1.
Like capitalisn1 in general, acadcn1ic capitalisn1 is about con1pctitioncon1pctition for funding, students, and-for son1c schools-prestige. !m The
prima1y con1pctitors arc institutions, vvhich arc en1boclied by the actors \vho
operate therein: faculty, students, and adn1inistrators.B~J Net\.vorks arc
central to viability \·\~thin the acaclcn1ic capitalist systen1.! 111 As such,
institutional actors seek to link institutions (and thcn1sclves) to the n1odern,
knovvlcdge-based cconon1y.!ll These links n1ost often take the forn1 of"nc\v
circuits ofknovvleclgc"-partnerships \vith the private sector, invcstn1cnts in
marketing, product dcvclopn1cnt and student services, and an expanded
1nanagerial core to handle these nevv dcn1ands.~ 1 2 Funclan1cntally, the goal

85. See id. al I08 (arguing lhal republican ideals in the young nation's history
cont1ibuled lo liberalization of higher education in the Lnitcd States).
86. See, e.g., Trow, s11j1m note 82, at 57 (calling the federal go\Trnincnt's approach to
disbursing land grants under the lvlorrill Acts "extraordinarily pennissi\-c'').
87. See DAVID L. KJRP, SI·IAKESPEr\RE, El:\STE!i'\, AND THE BOTl'O.\·I L!.'\E: THI~
l'dARKETJNG OF H1c~1-JER EDCCATJON 2 (2003) ("For better or worse-for bcucr mu/ worse,
really-1\n1erican higher education is being lransfonncd by both lhe power and the ethic of
the n1arketplacc.").
88. See, e.g., SHEIL.\ SL.'\UGHTFR & GARY H.HOADES, Ac.--\DL\JIC CAPITALIS.\I A..'\\D THE
NE\V ECONOi'l'IY: 1\ifARKETS, STATE, .>\!"\JD HIGHER EDUCATIO!'\ I {200'1).
89. Id.
90. See id. al 24 (providing examples of organizations and networks that act as
intem1ediaries between the public and private sectors).
91. Id. at l.
92. Id.
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of institutions competing in this cnvironn1cnt is to generate incon1c,~n
particularly fron1 "alternative revenue strcan1s/'9-I \vith the assun1ption that
robust, diversified funding vvill lcad to gTcatcr prestige, better students, and
increased viability. 9.'i
.A. li.lwu)ledge-Based Ec01wnIV
In a knO\\'icclgc-bascd cconon1y, kna\;,.'lcdgc is a con1n1odity that \vhcn
exploited can reap tangible benefits upon the posscssor.!lli I-Iighcr education
institutions arc central to the ki10\vlcdgc-basccl cconon1y because they arc
considered "a 1najor source of alienable kno\vlcdgc. "!17 In other \Vorcls, as
creators, holders, and sellers of kno\vlcdgc, these institutions hold the key to
cconon1ic gro\vth and the social cohesion that often accon1panies such
gTovvth."B As a result, one of the n1ost pressing issues concerning the nature
and function of higher education is ho\v it can ensure that citizens can be
productive participants \Vithin this cconon1y.~l!l And just like the ki10\vledgcbascd cconon1y facilitates opportunity and success for possessors of vital
kno\vlcdgc, it "increasingly eliminates those \Vithout education and training
beyond high school fron1 employment opportunities that can support a
n1iddlc-class standard ofliving." 10o
The relatively nc\v cn1phasis on knovvlcclgc as a tool of cconon1ic vitality
has created a n1arket for education and has changed the n1otivations and
9'.1. See id. at 11 (defining acade1nic capilalis1n as ''the pursuit of1narket and n1arkc1Iikc
[sic] activities [by colleges and uni\·crsitics] lo generate external l'C\'Cnucs").
911-. Ste.}.--\.\!ES C. HEAR>:, A.\J. CoL:.'\CJJ. O:\' EDL:c., D!\'ERSIF\'I.\G CA.\JPLS RE\'EXL'E
STRE.-\.\lS: Oi'!'ORTL'.\JTJES .--\.'\D RISKS l (2003) (idcntil\'ing ''allcn1ative rc\·enuc strea1ns" as
those fron1 sources other than stale appropriations or tuilion and (ces).
95. (j: id. at 5 (staling lhat instilulions arc being !(weed "to seek acJditiOnaJ rc\·enuc
sources" to tl1CCl lhe clcn1ands of "increased expectations" and the threats of "new pro\·idcrs
a11d 1cd1nologic~").
96. See SL--\LGHTER & RHOADES, .wpm note flfl, at 15 ("[I(]nowlcdgc is a raw n1atc1ial
to be converted to products, processes, or service.").
97. Id.
98. ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPER.·\TIUN & DEV., EDLCATIO!\' POLICY A.\A!.YSIS: FOcl:s
O.'\ H1ca-1ER EDL:cxno>:; 2005-200612 (2006) Ll1creinaftcr OECD Pol.ICY A\'ALYS!S].
99. S('e PATRICK i'vI. C:\LL--\.c"\' ET.--\!.., THE Nxr'L CTR. FOR Pun. POLICY & 1--:IJGHER
EnL:c., Goon Pouc:Y, Goon PRACTJCE: L\.!!'RO\'l;\'G OurcO.\IES Al"\'D PRODUCTJ\'J'JY ].'\
HIGHER
EDL:C:\'rIO.\";
A
GL:JDE
FOR
POLICY:\l:\KERS
l
(2007),
http:/ I \Vww .highereducalion .org/ reports/Policy _Practice/ind ex.sh tnll
(asserting
that
opporluni!ics for higher education arc not "as widespread as they need lo be lo place
Americans in good jobs, fuel econon1ic growth, pro1nolc social mobility and social justice,
and sustain the country's den1ocratic ideals").
100. THE l\AT'L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY & HIGHER EDUC., 1vfEASURING lJP 2006: THE
.:\1.--\TIO.'\.--\L
REPORT
CARD
O:\'
HIGHER
EDUCATION
20
(2006),
http://n1easuringup.highereducalion.org/ _docs/2006/f\.TalionalRcport_2006.pd(
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n1inclscts of students. Students arc increasingly \riC\ving education as a
product and thcn1sclvcs as consun1crs. 101 t\cadcn1ic capitalisn1 dictates that
" [s] tu dent consu1ncrs choose ... colleges and univcrs1t1cs that they
calculate arc likely to bring a return on educational invcstn1cnt."Io2 The
traditional student n1otivation-lcarning for learning's sake-is n1aking
\vay for contcn1porary realities and pressures \vhcrc education is
increasingly seen as a private, rather than public, goocl. 10 3 Therefore, as
the \'aluc of a college education has skyrockctccl, io-t schools ha\T been
increasingly required to "rcfra1nc thcn1sclvcs as both education and business
institutions." 105

B.

,,.\,.ew Technologies

'rechnology has changed "ho\v students learn, ho\V professors teach and
conduct research, and ho\v adn1inistrators n1anage institutions." 11 Hl Today,
111any schools offer courses via distance learning fran1e\vorks. Professors arc
nO\V able to analyze large datasets in seeking kno,vledge and arc able to
collaborate \Vith colleagues fron1 all over the \<vorld. 107 1~cchnology's
practical effect \vithin the academic capitalist systen1 has been to \·viclen
learning options for students and to increase con1pctition an1ong

101. See, e.g., SL.\l.:GHTER & RHOADES, supra note 88, at 12 ("[R]aising ttiition ... has
hcigbLenecl students' and parents' eonsun1er consciousness about what they expect in tcrn1s
or their cducatioual experience.
These changed expectations reshape student identity
fron1 that of learner to that 0Cconsu1ner.").
102. Id. a! l---2 (discussing how students "increasingly choose 1n~jors linked to the nc\\'
ccono1ny, such as business, con1nnrnications, [and] 1ncdia arts").
10'.·). See, e.g., id. at 42·.. 43 ("By the 1980s and 1990s, higher education was collstrued less
as a nc:cessary public or social good and n1orc as an individual or p1ivatc good, justi()ring
·u5cr pays· politic.~.") (citation oinittcd).
IO·L THU.\L\Sj. K.A:\"E, THE PRJC:E OF A.D.\.JISSJO.\": RETl-l!.\"K!.\"G Ho\\· A.\ll~RICA.:"\"S P ..\Y
FOR COLLEGE I {1999) (notjng that the difference in earnings between a high school
gradua1c and a college graduate incrca5ed fi-0111 19°/o in 1980 to 52°/o in 199.'J). But see
fd!CHAEL S. i\ICPHERSO.\" & J'v!ORTOi\ 0\VE:\ SCH ..\PIRO, THE STLiDEX!" A.ID GA.\IE:
lVIEETl.\"G ::\EED ASD Rt-:\\'ARDJNG 1~ALE:\'T l.\" t\.\JERlCA.J'\ HIGHER EDL:CAT!Oi\ 40 (199/l)
(arguing that n1uch or the increased eeonornic di!Tercntiation between lc\'cls or education is
inostly attributable to a decline in the value or a high school education, rather than an
increase in the value of a college education).
105. Eric J. A.nctil, Selling !iig!1er Educalion: i.\1mkeling and AdvertL1ing America's Colleges and
[iniversitin 3, in 34 A.SI-IE HIGHER EDUC. REPORT (J(clly 'Vard cl al. eds., 2008).
I 06. Patticia J. Gun1port & Barbara Spo111, l1L>lilutional Ada/Jtalion: Demands 1'0r
il1mwgemenl Reform and [lniIJeniry Adminislration, in 14· HIGHER EnL:CATIO!\·: 1-IA.!~DBOOK OF
THEORY :\."\D RESEARCH 103, 109 Gohn C. Smart & \Villian1 G. Tic111cy eels., 1999).
107. See OECD POLICY A~ALYSJS, supra note 98, at 18 (describing the in1pact of new
digital technologies on higher education).
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institutions for both students and faculty n1cn1bcrs. 11 m 'l'cchnology has also
led to greater institutional operating cfficicncics, 10 '1 a trend that has allo\vccl
some institutions to better harness the acadcn1ic capitalist systcn1 to their
advantagc. 1111

G: Globalization
Broadly, globalization is "the flo\v of technology, cconon1y, kno,vlcdgc,
people, valucsLJ and ideas ... across bordcrs." 111
The phcnon1cnon
cncon1passcs virtually all aspects of 1nodcrn society, and the extent to \vhich
nations cn1bracc it varics. 112 As the \vorld's ccono111ics have bccon1c
increasingly kno\vlcdgc-bascd and integrated, dcn1ands for globalizcd trade
in higher education have bccon1c n1orc vocal. 11 :l This trade cn1boclics
acadcn1ic capitalis111, as it "attract[sJ foreig11 capital, invit[cs] competition,
and produc[cs] a profit." 11 ·1 The globalizcd trade in higher education
involves millions of people 1!5 and billions of dollars. 11 1i

108. l'darvin \V. Peterson & David D. Dill, [,cndenla11di11g Ifie Competitive Envimnment efthe
Poslsecondal)' !Gwwltdge !ndusll)', in PL..\N.\"!.\"G A.:\D 1VL\.\"AGE.\IE.\"T FOR A CHA.'\GL\'G
E:--'\'lllO:\":'dE.\"T: A J-JA.\"DBOoK O.\" REDESJG:'\J.'\G PosTSECO.\"D:\JlY l.\"STITL:·no.'\s 3, 13-25
(1997).
109. Ser, e.g., CAROL:-\. 'f\\'lGG, THE .:\...\T'L C·1 R. FOR Pt:n. POLICY & HIGHER EnL:c.
CoLm.SE REDl~SIG:\ I.\l!'ROVF-S LE.-\R.\"l.\"C A\"D REDLCES COST l (2005), available al
http://ww\v.highcreduca1ion.org/reports/pa_corc/corc.pdf (discussing a technology-based
course redesign pn~jcct that reduced the costs of offering 1hesc courses by an average of 37°/o
/Or the participants).
110. See gnwmfb· RJCHARD S. Rt'CH, HIGHER ED, l.\"C.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT
l;.\"J\"ERSIT\" (2001) (discussing the elli::ct of proprietary schools' close altention lo
opcration:al ellicicncics).
l 11. t_:;\"JTED XATIO.\"S EDt:C., SCIE:\T!FIC & CL:LTL:R...\L 0Rc;., 1-IIUHER EDUCATJO:\ !:\
A Gt.OB...\L!ZED SOCIETY G (200'1), http:/ /uncsdoc.unesco.org/inu1gcs/OO I '.{/001362/
l 362 1J.7e.pdf [hcreina!ier L'XESCO, Gl.Of"l.-\LIZJ~D Socn:·1y] (quo talion on1iued).
112. See id. ("Globalization afTects each country in a clifTl·rcnt way due to each nation's
individual history, lradilions, cultures, resources[,] and priorities.") (quotation oinittcd).
113. See OECD POLICY A:'\ ...\LYSIS, supra note 98, at 103 ("'fherc is growing interest in
ways to build cun1ulali\"C knowlcclgc across the profr·ssion .... ").
114. N.\1. \1ARGHESE, C.\'J'J"ED ?\ATIO.\"S EDL:C., SCIE.\"TlFIC & CCLTLJRAL 0RG.,
GLOBt\LJZATJO.!\ OF HIGHER EDUC ...\TIO:\ ...\.\"D CROSS-BORDER STl.'.DE:\T i\:IOBILITY 9
(2008), http://www.uncsco.org/iiep/PDF /pubs/2008/ Globalizalion_lJE.pdf.
11.'i See 1d. at 11 1·'In 2006, there were 2.7 1nillion studenls sludying
abroad.
[P]rqjcctions ... indicate that the clcn1and ... will increase to 7.2 1nil!ion by

2025.").
116. See "C.\"JTED XATJO:\S Ence., SC!E.\"TJFIC & Ct:LTL:R.-\L ORG., lvIEET!:\'G OF H!GHER
EDUCATJO!'\ PARTNERS: SY.\"THESIS REPORT O:\" TRE:\"DS :\!'<D DEVELOP:\lE:\TS JN HIGHER
Eoucxno.\' SINCE THE \VORLD CONFERENCE o~ HIGHER EDUCATION (1998-2003) 23
(2003), http:/ /portal.uncsco.org/ cducation/cn/filcs/20031/l056141748 lsynlhcsis_rcporl
.pdf/synthesis_report.pdf (csti111ating that in 2003 proprietary education generated $365
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Unsurprisingly 1 the principle n1oti\·ation behind higher education
globalization is ccono1nic. 117 Individuals possessing foreign credentials can
broaden cn1ployn1cnt prospects and dcn1and higher salaries. 1 Ill Institutions
can generate large sun1s of revenue by attracting foreign studcnts. 11 ~ 1
Govcrnn1cnts can exploit the globalizcd kno,vlcdgc of their vvorkforcc in
dealings \vith foreign countcrparts.12 11 In response, the 'Vorld Trade
Organization forn1ally con1111oditizccl education under the General
i\grccn1cnt on Trade in Services (GATS) in J 995. 121 Under Gi-\'J'S,
education trade cncon1passcs cross-border supply and consun1ption, as \Vell
as the presence of com1nercial providers in foreig11 countrics. 122
Technology is the pnn1ary facilitator of globalization; as such,
globalization has had n1any of the san1c effects on higher education as
technology.
Learning opportunities have been broadened, as have
opportunities for acadcn1ic collaboration. 1'.l:-1

D. JVeoLiberal J~lnancial Aid PolicieJ
N eoliberalisn1 is prcn1iscd on encouraging productivity through the
en1po\vern1cnt of individuals as economic actors_ 12-1- Salient characteristics
of neoliberal policies arc "privatization, comn1ercialization, deregulation,
and rcrcgulation." 12.'J 1'he 1972 An1endn1cnts to the Higher Education Act

billion \1·orldwide).
117. Ste \'..\RGHESE, .wpm note 114·, at '.J (noling 1hat although econon1ic growth depends
on nun1crous 18.ctors, "hu1nan capital" has becon1c an increasingly in1porlanl econmnic
dri\Tr).
1I8. Ser id. at 11 (explaining that cross-border education is n111tually beneficial for
providers and beneficiaries or education).
I 19. See, e.g., l~XESCO, GLOR.\Ll/.t·:n Soc1E·1 Y, rnpra note 111, at 8 (discussing the
increased n1oven1cnt of' students and scholars between countries ''for con11nercial and /())·profit pu1voses").
120. See, r.g., OECD POLICY A..\"..\LYSIS, .~upm 110\c 98, al 24 ("A~ Lhc cost and
1nultidisciplinary nalure of research at the scientific frontier increase, countries will also
increasingly need to draw on ideas generated abroad.'').
121. See VARGHESE, .rnj;m note I 14, at 11 ("The GA.TS [General Agrcc111cnt on Trade
in Se1vices] ... represents a set of n1ultiiateral rules goyerning intc111ational trade in
services.").
122. Id. at 11-12.
123. Ur.iESCO, GLOBAI.JZl·]) SOC!lTY, supra note 111, at 8 (listing new dcvclop1nents
thal globalization has helped facilitate in higher education).
124. See, e.g., SL\l'.GHJ'ER & RHOADES, suj1ra note 88, at 20 ("The ncoliberal state Cocuscs
not on social wcH'are fOr the citizenry as a whole bul on enabling individuals as econon1ic
actors. To that end, ncolibcral states 111ovc resources away from social welfare functions
toward production (unctions.").
125. Id. at 21.
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arc considered landn1ark pieces of lcgislation. 12 li /\n1ong other things, the
An1cndn1cnts n1adc fCdcral student aid portable, 111caning students could
use their aid at the schools of their choicc. 1'.l 7 1'hc 1\n1cnd1ncnts also
"broadened the definition of \vhich institutions \Vere eligible to receive
students \·Vith federal aid." 12B Specifically, proprietary and non-degree
granting institutions could 110\V collect Title I\1 aid fi·on1 studcnts. 1'.l!l ~fhcsc
shifts \Vere classic ncolibcral policies, in that they sought to encourage
higher education efficiencies by cn1po,vcnng students and forcing
institutions to engage in a "n1arkctlikc [_sicJ con1pctition ... for federally
subsidized student tuition dollars."UIJ The eITects of neoliberal policies arc
apparent in other areas of higher education as \vell, including rescarch. 1:ii

E. Changing Student }:Jopulations
Broader access to higher education and the en1ergence of the knO\·vledgcbascd economy have fi_iclccl higher education cle1nand from ne\v student
nlarkcts. Students of color and nontraditional adult learners arc seeking
higher education in increasing nun1bers. I3 2 Affirn1ative Action progran1s
and the expansion of nonselectivc colleges and universities have helped spur
this increased level of participation. 133 The nun1ber of students of color
undertaking higher education increased almost 49°/o bet\vccn 1994 and
2004.13..J- Adult learners no\v con1prise niore than half of the college student
126. See, e.g., Trow, .rnpm note B2, at 59 (as~erting that the 1972 education a1ncndn1cnts
"established higher education as a national prio1ity in its own right").
127. See id. at 60 (explaining that student aid had previously been awarded directly to
institutions in the fon11 of block gl·ants).
128. Peterson & Dill, supra note I08, al 5-6.
129. Id. at 6.
l 30. SL\l:G!-!TLR & RHOADES, supm note 88, at 35.
131. ,)'ee id. at 21 (discussing the effects of the Bayh-Doyk ,c\ct, which allo\1·s institutions
to dai1n O\\'ncrship of patents that arc based on research conducted with kdcral funds).
132. See COUi'\C!L FOR ADL~1;r & EXPERIE:'\TJAL LEAR.'\J!'<G, SERVl.'\G ,c\DLJ.T LE:\R:\:ERS
IN I-IJGHER EDUCATION: FI!\"Dli'K;s FROi\I CAEL's BE:\CH:'l!.--\RKr:-.:G STt.:oy I ( l 999),
http://www.cacl. org/ pd[/ p ublication_pdfI CAEL0/o2 OB en ch1narki ng 0/o20 Fin din gs 0io2 OExc
cutivc0/o20Sun1n1ary.pdf (dcGning the adult learner as financially indcpcndcnt, with n1c~jor
responsibilities outside or school, and "whose principal identities have evolved beyond the
role ofCull-tiine student").
133. See 1viichacl I<..irst, Secondary and Po~lsecondal)' Linkages, in ECO:'\O.\llC l>:EQU.-\LJTY A:'\D
HIGHER E1Jl;C.--\TJON: ACCESS, PERSISTENCE, ..\..'\D SUCCESS 44-, 4-4---'l-6, 56 (Stacy DiclcrtConlin & Ross Rubenstein eds., 2007) (noting the substantial rise in college enrolhncnt,
especially in community colleges, and the fact that 80°/o o[ postsecondary students "attend
posL~econdary institutions that either accept all qualified applicants or arc open
enrollment").
]34-. BRYAN_J. COOK & DIA.:.'\/A I. CORDOVA, AM. COUNCIL O>: EDUC., l\1Jl\OR!TIES Ii\
HJGHER EDUC.--\TIO:'\: T\\1Ei\TY-SECO,\'J) Al\"NUAL STATUS REPORT 3 (Supp. 2007),
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population. J'.-1.'i ..-fhcir prin1ary n1otivation for undertaking higher education
is job skills training and profCssional dcvclop111cnt. 1'.'lti \ Vith these nc\v
consumers have con1c llC\V needs and dcn1ands that vary fron1 those of the
"typical college student" of the past. 1:-17 And institutions seeking to exploit
these nc'v n1arkcts have been forced to acijust accordingly. i:rn Put sin1ply,
the aca_dcn1ic capitalist systcn1 is pron1pting these institutions to respond to
consu1ncr dcn1ands.
1

F

Rising Tuition

State appropriations to higher education (as percentage of overall
budgets) have declined steadily over the past three decades. u~i As a result,
institutions have had to generate 111ore "n1arkct incon1c" 1-10 principally in
the forn1 of tuition. HI Bcn.vccn 1976 and 2005, the average cost of a public
four-year institution increased 270°/o. 1-l-2 Cornpounding the eifects of rising
tuition has been a decline in federal funding of need-based student aid,
particularly Pell Grants. 1-l-'.l T'vcnty years ago, the n1axin1un1 Pell Grant
covered 60°111 of tuition at a typical public four-year institution; in 2006,
that purchasing po\ver had declined to 33°/o. 1' 1+ The discretionary nature of
hup: I I\ 1'1\'\1·. accnc L. edu I Al\J IT e1np I atc. cfin ?Seel ion ::::: CAREE&T cn1 plate:::: I CIVIi Content
Display.cfn1&ContentID::::2'.17 I 6.
135. 0FF!CE OF POLICY DEY. & H.. ESE.·\RCH, C.S. DEl' "1" OF LABOR, ADULT LEAR'.\'ERS !.'\
l-J1GHER EnL·c:..\TJO:\: BAtUlll·:Rs TO St:cc:i-:ss A.\"D STR.-\TEGJES TO I:-.1rRovE Rt-:sL:1:1's 3
(2007),
http://1vclr.dokta.gov/rcscarch/FullTcxl_l)ocu1ncnts/Aclult 0/o20LC'arners 0/n20
in°/o20HighC'r 0/o20Eclucation I .pelf.
136. .Yee id. (discussing ho11· cr01101nic \'olatility has fueled a "growing dc1nand frff
continual learning and skill enhanccn1C'nt'').
l'.17. Id. (idc1llifying the ''typical college stucknt" of the past as a "financially dependent,
18-ycar-old high school gradua1e who enrolls full tiinc'').
l'.18. Ser, e.g., Peterson & Dill, .lllpra not(' 108, at lfl-19 (discussing how the rising
popularity of non-degree and continuing education progra1ns an1ong adult learners has
/Orccd institutions to reassess their progra111n1atic oITe1ings).
139. See, r.g., SL.\LGHTER & RHOADES, .wj1m note fl8, at 13 (noting thcll this trend
occurred du1ing thC' 1970s, 80s, and 90s).
140. ANCTIL, J11j1m note 10.'), al 4 (''[lvl]arket incon1c has increasingly substituted /Or
public appropriations in higher education .... ").
I'll. See, e.g., SL.-\L:cHTER & RHOADES, supra note 88, at 12 (explaining that increasing
tuition has led in turn to higher expectations fron1 parents and students on the quality or
education rccci1·cd).
142. See, e./f,., Bridget Terry Long & Erin Riley, Financial Aid: 11 Broken Bridge to College
.1lffe.u-?, 77 HARV. Enuc. REV. 39, 40 (2007) (noting that n1edian Ji:tn1ily inco1ne only
increased by 23°/o during the sainc pc1iod).
143. See, e.g., id. at 45 (noting that the n1axin1un1 Pell Grant has decreased by 20°/o fron1
1975-1976 to 2005-2006 after accounting for inflation).
i '}4-. COLLEGE BOARD.C:0:\1, TOTAL PELL GR.--\l\"T FU:\DING DECUXES FOR FIRST Tl.\JE
J,\" Six YEARS (2006), http://ww\1'.collcgcboard.con1/prod_do1vnloads/prcss/cost06/
0
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higher cdtlcation funding has niade it an easy target for cuts, as entitled
expenses such as health care increasingly strain state and federal btJdgcts. 1-l-5
Students no\v finance a higher proportion of their tuition llSing loans.
Bcnveen 1990 and 2004, the percentage of full-tin1e students \vith loans
rose fron1 36°10 to 50°1o. 1·Hi Bet\vecn 1993 and 2004, cun1ulative debt levels
for college students at public and private institutions rose 76°10 and 5 7°10
respectively. 1-17
This shift has largely privatized the cost of higher
education, thereby further entrenching the studcnt-as-consun1er n1indset
that has con1e to characterize acadcn1ic capitalisn1. 1--l 8

(;. Dnnands)Or JlccounLabiti{v
Against the backdrop of declining funding cn1crged the den1and for
educational accountability. Institutions arc no\v being called upon to
clen1onstrate their "value for n1oncy"-an expression used to denote an
organization's cconon1y, efficiency, and effectivcness. 1-l-9 In other \Vords,
institutions have had to provide evidence of successful outcon1cs,
particularly as they relate to student lcarning. 1::in Institutional assurances
arc no longer sufficient, and assumptions arc no longer freely granted.
_Fundan1cntally, policyn1akers \Vant colleges and universities to behave n1orc
like private industry.
In fact, the "resurgence of productivity and
perforn1ance in An1erican business" has been cited as an in1petus behind
the increased calls for educational accountability . 15 1 Private sector
\Vatch,vords like "perfonnance," "invcstn1cnt," and "efiiciency" have
becon1c part of the higher education lexicon.1.12 Accountability models first

pdl_grant.'\_06.pdf.
145. S1'e, t.g., K.ASE. .flt/Hu note I 04, at 65-GG, 69-70 (illustrating an association bct\\'cen
increases in state I\Jcclicarc spending and increases :in public four-year tuitions, and
discussing the 1nannr:r in \1·hich entitlc1nent spending has a!ICcted federal spending on
education, particulady gTanl progrmns such as Pell).
1'}6. Long&Riley,.wpranotc 14'.2,at47.
14-7. Id. at 47-4-8.
l'l-8. See, e.g., SL-\L:GHTER & RHOADES, supra note 88, at 283 (noting that this trend has
:ignored the beneficial externalities of higher education).
149. Robert Ball & Jalil J-Ialwachi, Pe!finmanff Indicalon in f!igher Educalion, 16 HIGHER
Ence. 393, :l93 (1987).
150. I\.fa1i!yn C. K.aincen & Iv1anudj . .J ustiz, llsi11g Anessment in Ilig!u:r Education to lmproi'e
Success/Or J1inorif:J St11de11l1, GG PE.-\BODY.J. EDUC. 46, 4-7 (1988) (asserting that state asscssn1cnt
of student outcomes "en1ergcd as a rcn1arkable new feature in American higher education"
as J'ar back as 1985).
151. Alicia C. Dowd, From Accers to Outcome Equi!J: Revitalizing the DemOl:ratic Afission q/the
Communi!J College, 586 A:\":\".--\1.S A\L ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 92, 93 (2003) (quotation
on1iued).
152. Seegeueralb']OSEPH D. CREl·T~H, S. Rt·:G'LEDcc. Bn., L!NKE\.G HIGHF.R EouCATIO\"
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tested (and often discredited) in the privatc. sector have fOuncl hon1cs in
higher education institutions. 153
Dcn1ands for accountability have manifested in various \vays that reflect
the capitalistic nature of education.
J\.1Iost pron1incntly, states and
accrediting agencies have required institutions to develop pcrforn1ancc
indicators and n1cthods for assessing thcn1. l'vlany states have also tied
institutional funding to pc1forn1ancc. 13 -1 \Vhilc pcrforn1ancc indicators take
n1any fonns, they arc most often expressed nun1crically, l.'JJ sin1ilar to private
sector indicators. ~rhcy can be internal in nature (e.g., graduation rates,
research funds obtained, and teaching quality), external (e.g., en1ployn1ent
rates of graduates), and operational (e.g., unit costs, class sizes, and course
options). L'Hi The accountability moven1ent has also contributed to a shift in
hovv institutions present thcn1selves to potential consu111ers. It is no
coincidence that schools no\v tout cn1ployn1ent rates and outcon1c-based
indicators in advertisen1ents to prospective students. 'fhc accountability
1novcment has played a considerable role in fostering the spread of
acaden1ic capitalisn1 -..vithin higher education, particularly in tern1s of hovv
institutional effectiveness is vievved internally and externally.
fl. ]\reu_1 fligher Education I)roviders

The advent of ne\·V providers cxen1plifies the interrelated nature of the
trends contributing to the spread of acaclen1ic capitalisn1. The kno,vleclgcbased econon1y has increased den1and for higher education, \vhich, along
-..vith ncoliberal financial aid policies, has inccnti,,~zed entry of ncvv
providers. Technological advancen1ents and globalization have cased these

PERFOR,\l:\.:'\CEl~DICA'J'ORS 'lT1

GO.-\J,S (2000), hllp://c1ic.ed.go\'/PDFS/ED4-51781.pdC
153. See Gary Rhoades & Barbara Sporn, QJuiliQ· A.1·J11rm1ce i11 Europe and the L'.S:
Prqfi:.1:1·io11al and Political Ewnomic Framing ef lliglu:r Education Poliq, 43 Hil;HER EDCC. 355, 366
(2002) (explaining ho\\' accountability 1nodcls "ani\-C at higher education's doorstep" aHcr
initial lrials in business that lead to these n1odcls being "discarded") (quota1ion on1ittcd).
I 54-. See Dowel, .rnj;ra note l 51, al ! 09-10 {noting that by 2000, aln1ost three-quarters of
the states had performance funding syslen1s in place and tha1 the shill away fro1n inputbascd funding to funding based on outco1ncs betokened a new en1phasis on accountability).
155. Robert Ball & Rob \Vilkinson, The [i1·e and Abuse q/PedOnnance lndirnton in [,'KI ligher
Education, 27 HIGHER EDUC. 417, 418 ( J 994-) (defining perfonnance indicators as
"[n]u1ncrical values which provide a 1ncasurc1ncnt for assessing the quantitative
perfrHn1ancc of a syste1n").
156. Ball & I-Ialwachi, supra note 14-9, at 401; see alro Bob Barnetson & l\larc Cut1;ght,
Perfonnunce Indicators as Conceptual 1Cdmologies, 40 HIGHER Ence. 277, 278-79 (2000)
(classifying indicators in terms of five organi;.:ational clc1nents to which per!On11ancc
indicators are applied: (I) Inputs, e.g., faculty, facilities; (2) processes, e.g., teaching; (3)
products, e.g., courses completed; (4-) outputs, e.g., degTecs awarded, grants secured; and (5)
outcon1cs, e.g., e1nploy1ncnt rates).
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pro\'idcrs' entry into the n1arkct. Changing student populations and rising
tuition an1ong traditional institutlons have fostered ncvv markets and
enhanced preexisting ones. Dcn1ands for accountability have introcluccd
outcon1cs-bascd parlance and practices into the higher education
industry-a shift upon \vhich nC\·\' providers have been able to capitalize.
Proprietary schools arc the n1ost salient nc\V higher education providers.
'fhcsc providers have entered the n1arkct and, in n1any \vays, adapted to
nc"v realities n1orc cfICctivcly than their traditional peers. For starters,
proprietary institutions have been successful at rcfran1ing thcn1sclvcs in
response to the con1n1oditization of education. In fact, it could be argued
that they never needed to rcfran1e in the first place. Their profit-generating
n1otivcs already required thcn1 to respond to n1arket demands in \vays that
nonprofit institutions did not. They have also adapted through an
evolution of their ovvn. The conventional n101n-and-pop operations arc
beeon1ing relics of the past as large, n1ulti-can1pus corporations no\v
don1inatc the industry.1.17 In response to market dcn1ands, nlany of these
institutions have also transcended their vocational n1oorings and 110\v
a\varcl degrees up to the doctoral lcvcl. 158 Proprietary schools arc 110\v
an1ong the largest and niost successful education providers in the
country, L'i~l validating their market-driven approach and excn1plifying their
superior adaptive ability.
III. THE RISE OF PROPRIETARY COLLEGES
JVluch has been \vrittcn about the recent "arrival" of proprietary schools
into the higher education n1arkct; ho\vevcr, "reen1crgcnce" n1ight be a
better descriptor. The history of proprietary schools in the United States is
surprisingly long-pre-dating the s1gn1ng of the Declaration of
Independence. They \Vere fixtures during Colonial tin1cs as alternatives to
apprenticeships and the colleges of the day. 160 'l'hc purposes of these early
institutions evolved fron1 teaching basic literacy to career training. u; These
1

l 5 7. Sre FOSTER, .rnj1ra note 23, at 8 (referring to these schools as ''super sys1e1ns''J.
158. See, e.g., ANCTii., c,upra no\c 105, at 22.
l.'"l9. The student cnrolhncnts of the five largest proprietary schools arc as follows: Apollo
Group (Parcn\ Cornpany ofl;QP), +20,700; Education i\Janagcn1en1 Corporation, 112,700;
I<aplan Higher Education, 103,300; Career Education Co1vorat.ion;, 93,100; and Dc\lry,
90,365. Erica R. Hendry, For-Prefil College.> See 1~1Tge Increases in Enrollment and RrJenue,
CHRO:\. HIGHER Enuc., .!\ug. 25, 2009, http://chronide.co1n/article/For-Profit-CollegesScc-Lar/48173/.
I 60. FOSTER, supra note 23, al 13.
161. RlJCH, supra no\c 110, at 52 (chronicling how student inlercs\ prmnptcd early
propric1a1y schools lo expand their CLln;cula lo include courses that taughl "skills that were
in high dcn1and by c1nploycrs").
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institutions cn1bodicd the entrepreneurial spirit that \VOuld con1c to
syn1bolizc the founding of the United States and the spread of higher
cclucation. 11i:l These institutions also cn1braccd the ideal of educational
access, 16 ~~ an ethos that \Vould hasten their rccn1crgcncc in the early 1970s.

A.

Title IV Erj1a11siu11

The l970s brought vast expansion of the proprietary school 1narkct. 111 ·1
The 1972 /\111cncln1cnts to the Higher Education Act sought to broaden
higher-education access by n1aking proprietary institutions eligible to collect
Title IV aic\. 1(;.'i i\nxious to tap into Title I\1, propricta1y schools
aggressively recruited students by touting progran1s that purported to
provide job training; ho\vevcr, n1uch of the pron1ised training never
materializcd. 11i 6 1'he lack of effective oversight provided an cnvironn1cnt in
vvhich shan1 schools and diplon1a n1ills operated vvith virtual in1punity. Hi 7
As a result, student defaults on Title IV loans increased sharply.16 8 The
l 990s brought closer scrutiny on the proprietary school sector, and bctvveen
1992 and 1997, aln1ost 800 schools \Vere shut dovvn or stripped of their
Title IV eligibility-\vhich effectively shut clo\vn schools not closed
outright. lli'1 But \vhilc the an1ount of docun1cnted in1proprieties an1ong
proprietary schools has fallen, the sector's disproportionate share of federal
investigations shovvs that in1proprieties rcn1ain a problen1.
B.

Students

Proprietary schools serve students currently undcrscrvccl by traditional
institutions. 170 They tend to enroll the "other 75 percent"-studcnts '\vho
162.
163.
educate
16'1·.

Id.
Id. at 57 (discussing how propriclary schools were mnong the lirst institutions to
fon11cr slaves and l\ativc An1ericans).
C.S. GE:\. Accot;.\"!'JNG OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-103,

PROPRIETARY

SCHOOLS:

POORER STt.:DE:\"j" OL:TCO,\IES AT SCHOOLS THAT RELY .tv101u: o,-.; FEDERAL STU])E,,T AID

3 ( 1997), avaiU1ble al http:/ /w\\'w.gao.gov/archivc/ 1997 /he97 l 03.pdf [hereinafter GA.O,
POORER OL:'J'CO:\JES].
J 6_").
See e.g., GAO, OVERSUPPLIED 0CCUPXr!ONS, supra note 22, at 7.
166. See, r.g., FOSTER, Jupra note 23, at 14.
167. id. ("During the 1970s and 80s, institutions operated with little or no oversight and
few co11straints in recruiting and training students. A !argc ntunbcr of institutions did not
provide the training advertised, did not comply with fair consumer practices, and
1nisn1anagcd finances.").
168. See, e.g., id.
169. Linehan, supra note 7, at 760.
170. See, e.g., Anli-Fraud llemings, supra note I 0, at 2 (stalcment or Rep. John Bochner,
Chain11an, H. Comm. on Educ. and the \'Vorkforcc) ("ProprictaI)' schools ... arc playing a
critical role in providing college access for son1c of our Nalion's n1ost vulnerable students.
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\Vere not in the top 25 percent of their high school classes and 'vho \-vould
be unlikely to enroll or be successful at other types of institutions." 171
Proprietary school students tend to be poorer 11 '.! and older than students at
traditional schools. 17 :l They arc also nlore likely to be first in their fan1ilics
to go to collcgc 1 17 ·1 be fen1ale, 11 ·1 and to belong to a racial or ethnic minority
group. 17 f1 1vfany proprietary schools a\varcl a disproportionately high
percentage of degrees through the doctoral level to black and llispanic
stuclents, 17 7 and their graduates typically con1plete dcgTcc requircn1ents
faster than graduates of traditional schools. 17 H 'J'hese statistics arc laudable,
and they confinn that proprietary schools help broaden access to higher
education.
Ho\vever, this access is niotivated n1orc by profit than
altruisn1. 17 ~ 1 1vforeover, this access con1es at a high cost, due to high rates of
attrition at these institutions and concornitant high rates of loan defaults
an1ong fOrmer students.
C.

Outc01nes

Proprietary schools suffer fron1 poor student outcon1cs.
Lo,ver
completion rates tend to create negative cascades that depress placen1ent

And thus, they arc playing a nitical rok in carrying oul the 1nission of the I-Iigher Education
Act.").
17 J. FOSTER, sujJra note 23, at 10 (quotation mnitted).
172. See G/'1.0, STRO:\GER OVERSIGHT, .l'lljJHJ note 13, at 20 (listing the 2004 annual
111cdian fan1ily incon1c for proprietary school stuclcnt.'i as $2-'J.,300, cmnparcd to $40,400 and
$49,200 !Or students at public and p1i\'alc nonprofit schools, respectively).
17'.~. Ste id. at 7 (finding that 56°/u or students at prop1ielary schools arc age iwcnly-li\T
and older, con1parcd to 35"/o and 38°/o at public and pri\·atc nonpro(il schools respectively}.
174. Sn id. at 20 (finding that 63°/n of prop1ictary school students' parents Jack a colkge
degree, con1pared lo 48°/o and 39°/o al public and private nonprofit schools, respectively).
17 5. See id. al 7 (finding that 63°/n of students at proprietary schools arc kn1alcs,
con1pared lo 54''./n and 56°/o al public and pri\·atc nonprofit schools rcspccti\Tly); see ulrn .-lntiFmud llearings, supra note 10, al 46 (statcn1enl of :."lick Glakas, President, Career College
1\ssociation) (stating that prop1iclary schools enroll a large percentage of single parents).
176. See GA.0, STRO.'\GER OVERSIGHT, .111pra note 13, al 8 (finding that 50':;o orstudenls
al prop1ietary schools arc non-white, coinparcd to 34°/o and 30°/o for studcnls at public and
p1i\'alc nonprofit schools, rcspcctivrly).
177. Prop1iclary schools award 25°/o of the associate's dcg1-ccs, 7°/o of the bachelor's
degrees, and 6°/o of the 1nastcr's degree earned by Hispanic ~tudents. 'Vaiden Cnivcrsity, an
online proprietary school, ranks ainong the top ten of doctoral degree-granters to black
students. Anti-Fraud 1fearings, .wpm note I 0, al '1-7.
178. Id. al 46 ("On average, students attending career colleges earn their associates
dcgree[s] clc\'cn n1onths sooner than students at con1nn1nity colleges.").
179. See K.IRP, supra note 87, al 253 (stating that proprietary schools "ha\'C no
con1mitment to the idea or public service, no sense of their n1ission as lied to the good or the
co1nn1onwcallh").
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rates and increase loan default rates. !Bo l,css than 25°/o of propricta1y
school students graduate \vithin six years of beginning their studies,
con1parcd to 55°/o and 64°/o at public and private nonprofit institutions
rcspcctivcly. 181 Regrettably, this statistic is probably inflated, given that it is
based on self-reported data, and proprietary schools have 111any incentives
to overstate graduation rates. I!!'.!
Placement rates also dcn1onstratc
inadequacies \vithin the sector. Schools \Vith the lo\vcst con1plction rates
tend to have the lo-\vcst placcn1cnt ratcs. 11n This observation is particularly
cla111ning because placcn1cnt rates do not account for attrition; only
students \vho con1plctc the progran1 arc included in the calculations. The
final links in the chain arc student loan default rates. Proprietary school
default rates exceed nonprofit schools at the nvo-, three-, and four-year
intervals. 1*H And once again, the validity of these nun1bers is questionable,
as the n1ethocl of calculation allO\VS schools to understate their actual
nun1ber of defaults. 18.'i
There arc n1any reasons for the lo\vcr con1plction rates at proprietary
schools-and not all of then1 arc nefarious. The prin1ary reason concerns
the negative association bet\veen reliance on Title IV aid and completion
ratcs.18ti This association arises because poorer students persist tovvards
college degrees at lo\vcr rates than vvcalthicr students.187 This phenomenon
holds true across higher education, irrespective of sector, and is often used
as a po\verful justification for those seeking increased or better-targeted
student aid. IBB And because proprietary schools enroll higher percentages
of poor students, it n1akcs sense that their completion and placcn1ent rates

180. GAO, POORER ()L:TcO.\JES, .wpm note 16 1·, at 5.
J 8 I. K..\"APP ET ,\L., Jupra note 6, at 12.
182. LOO.\"I.\" & DE\".-\.'\'!HJ::RY, .\'lljira note 29, at '.18 {"The reliability of the nu1nbers in
IPEDS is based solely on the reporting done by lhe institutions thcn1sch·cs. This is
1

extrcn1cly probkn1atic as il ka\"es nearly absolute discretion in the hands of schools that
ha\·e e\·c1y inccnti\T Lo inflate the nun1bcrs.").
183. 5're GAO, POORER 0LTC0.'dES, supra note 16 1}, at 9.
184. Sre GA.0, STRO:\"GER OVERSIGHT, .rn/Jm note 13, at 14~]5 (listing proprietary
school default rates that arc as nn1ch as 250°/o higher than the next highest rate-that of
public schools).
185. See id. at 13···14 ("l"J'Jhe rate captures only a s1nall portion of all student loan
dd~1uhs al schools.").
186. See GA.O, POORER OL:TCO;\JES, sujirn note 164. at 24-25 (de1nonstrating that
increased reliance by schools on Title I\7 revenue leads to lower con1plction and g1·aduation
rates, and higher default rates).
187. See Long & Riley, supra note 142, at 4-0 (explaining that only +'.YVo of students Croin
fan1ilics 1naking less than $30,000 per year ''inu11ediatcly entered a post-secondary
institution" co1nparcd to 75°/o ofstudenl.5 whose fa111ilics 1nakc 1norc than $50,000).
188. See, e.g., id. at 58 (concluding that the Pell Grant will provide 1nore access lo higher
education ror low-inco111e students).
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arc lo,vcr and their dc£'lult rates highcr. IB!l
Hovvevcr, not all factors contributing to these lo\-ver rates arc benig11.
ProprietaIJ' schools enroll n1any students \vho clearly lack the ability to
con1plctc a postsecondary progran1 of study. 1 ~lo In other \VOrds, they exploit
their role as access providers-for profit. As discussed earlier, forn1er
adn1issions representatives allege that they \Vere pressured to induce
cnrolhncnt an1ong unqualified students. i\nd as 60 1\1inuLes docun1cntcd,
proprietary schools engage in entrance exa111 in1proprictics in order to
ensure that all prospective students attain satisf3-cto1)· scores. i\ctions like
these ha\'C created a perception that proprietary schools care less about
their students and n1orc about their students' Title I\1 cligibility. 1'.ll
D. lndust~T

l"'oclay, the proprietary sector is don1inatcd by five publicly-traded
entities: Apollo Group (parent company of UOP), Education i\1fanagen1ent
Corporation, Kaplan Higher Education, Career Education Corporation,
and DcVry. Combined, these institutions enrolled n1orc than 820,000
students in 2009. 192 All told, there arc 2,900 Title IV-eligible proprietary
schoolsJ 93 providing both degree progran1s and vocational training. UH The
predominant niche of proprietary education rcn1ains career-focused
cducation.1!15
They have harnessed nc\v technologies in delivering

189. .)'er GAO, POORER 0UTCO:\!ES, supra note 164-, at 20 ("\Ve- believe knowing a
school's c01npletion rate helps predirl its place1nent rate and knowing both co1nplction and
placc1ncnt rates helps predict its default rate.").
190. See K.JRP, .wpm note 87, al 250 ("\Ve accept students who, on paper, arcn'l likely to
n1akc it. . .")(quotations on1itted).
191. Sl'l' .'Jnti-Fraad llearings, .\llpm note- 10, at 22 (statcn1cnt of Rep. 1\Jc1xinc \Vatcrs)
C'r1Jhe real n1oti\'C behind wanting to enroll more 1nino1ity and low incon1c students is that
they arc the 1110s! profitable students since they qualify for the- highcst ainounts of federal
financial aid and the s1nallest expected fa111ily contribution, or none at all.").
192. See Hcnchy, supra note 159.
193. L.\l.:RA G. KNAPP ET Al.., ..\-xl"L CTR. !-"OR EDUC. STATISTJC:S, t_:.s. DEP'T OF
EnL:c., XCES 2009-165, POSTSECO\'D.-\R\" l:\'STITUTJONS AND PRICE OF ATl"E.\"D.·\.'\'CJ·: !'\
THE UNITED STATES: FALL 2008, DEGREES AND OTHER A\VARDS CONFERRED 2007-08,
A'\D
!2-i\JO:\"TH E'\ROLLi\·lEi\-r: 2007-08
7 (2009), http://c1ic.cd.go\·/PDFS/

ED5067H.pd[
194. See FOSTER,

supra note 23, at 8 ("The p1in1ary purpose o[ for-profit postsecondary
institutions is preparing graduates for jobs or career advanccn1cnt. As a result, these
institutions generally oITer a sn1all, focused range of progrmns limitcd to high-dcn1and
occupational or professional fields."). But see gcnera![y GAO, OVERSUPPLIED QccL:P..\T!O.'\S,
supra note 22, at 4-5 (discussing the amount of federal financial aid used by studenL5 training
for low-demand fields).
195. See KJRP, .wpm note 87, at 242 (listing the lVfHA program as an cxan1pic o[ a
predon1inant niche of prop1ictary education).
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ccluc<ition progr3.n1n1ing, both onlinc and in the classroon1.1~it1 Their
progran1s arc flexible and accelerated, thus appealing to older students \vho
tend to be place-bound and lin1itcd in ho\v n1uch tin1c they can spend
attending classes. 1 ~ 1 i Given their adaptive skills, it should be no surprise that
\Vhilc traditional schools arc dealing \\'ith cnrolln1cnt and budgetary
shortfalls, proprietary schools arc experiencing vastly increased cnrolln1cnt
and rcvcnuc. 1(jfl

E. Prqjitahilifv
?\Jany proprietary schools arc highly profitable. In 2006, .Apollo Group
and ITT boasted rctnrns on invcstn1cnt capital of 69°/o and 40°1()
respectively, beating out con1panics such as Exxon l'vlobil and r.._.Jicrosoft. 1 '.l~J
Since 1995, Apollo's stock price has risen an unfathon1able 7,000°/o, and
Stock price has risen 1110re than 3,500°/o.200 1'he Stock prices for
other publicly traded education providers have experienced precipitous

rr'r's

196. See An1i-Fm11d Ilearings, supra nole IO, al 46 (stale1nent oC Kick Giakas, President,
Career College A.ssociation) ("For-profit instjlutions arc pionee1ing a wide array of
innovative progra1n ddi\TI)' n1cthodologics such as on-line, 1nodular, and \\'eekend
progTa1ns to con1plcn1cnl their traditional dassromn offerings.").
I 97. Ser id. ("Students choose to attend ror-prolit colleges because these ddiYcry 1nethods
1nec1 their tin1c and geographical needs, allowing thc1n to achic"e 1hcir postsecondary
education goals while continuing· to 1neet the den1ands of their C\'Cry day lives. On average,
students attending career colleges earn their associates degree eleven 111onths sooner than
students at con1n1unity colleges.'').
198. See Hendry, supr(/ note 159 ("'1'hc recession has kll nonprofit colleges and
universities across the country struggling \l~lh budget cuts and uncertainlies over cnrolhncnt,
but rnany for-profit institutions arc reporting record increases in student nun1bcrs and
H:\'Cnuc-a sign that the recession is pro1npling 111mT adults and nontradi1ional students 10
seek career training.").
199. HO\YARD 11. BLOCK, B.-\:'\K OF A:\L SEC.
LLC, STATE:\lE.\T BEFORE THE
SECRETARY OF EDL.'.C.-\TIO:'\'S CO.\l:\llSSIO'\ O'\ THE FVl'LlRE OF HIGHER EDt..:CATJO:\ 10
(2006), ht tp: I I' vw\ v. cd .gov I a bo u 1/bd scon11n /list I hi cdfu tu re/ 3 rd-111 ccting /block2. pelf.
200. On January 3, !995, Apollo and ITT slack were priced at $0.79 and $2.22,
respectively . .NCu.1 lUrk Slack Exchange Composite Tra11s11cti01H, 'VALL ST.j.,Jan. 3, !995, al 23,
auailable al http:/ /ww\v ,bigcharts.cmn/ custon1/w~jie/ wsjbb-histo1ical.asp?syn1b::::APOL
&dose_datc:::: l 0/o2F3°/o2Fl 995&x:::O&y:::O; .N:·'lSDAQ.i'{alionaL J1arket hsue.1~ \VALL s·i·.J., Jan.
3,
1995,
at
25,
http://www.bigcharts.co111/cuslon1/wsjic/wsjbbhistorical.asp?sy1nb:::csi&closc_dale::: I 0/o2F3°/o2F1995&x:::O&y:::O. By late 2009, 1hey were
trading at around $60 and $90 respectively. Biggest 1,000 Stocks, \VAL!. ST.j., N"ov. I3, 2009,
at
C8,
available
al
http:/ /www.bigcharts.con1/custom/w~jic/w~jbb
hislorical.asp?syn1b:::apol&dosc_datc::: 11 °/o2F l 3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O; \V~J .com, Historical
Quotes, ITT Educational Services, Inc, http:/ /www.bigcharls.com/custon1/w~jic/w~jbb
historical.asp?syn1b:::csi&close_datc::: 11°/o2FI3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O (last visited Aug. 4,
2010)
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increases as \vcll. 201
A n1aJor con1poncnt of proprietary schools'
profitability is operational efficiency. 202
]-<~

Operational Ejjiciencies

Like any profit-seeking entity, proprietary schools "place a high value on
running their operations efficiently and taking advantage of cconon1ics of
scale. "'lo:i '1'hcy n1inin1izc inefficiencies in acadcn1ic planning and teaching
by designing curricula ccntrally 20 + and relying principally on untcnurcd
faculty to render instruction. 2115 Son1c proprietary schools even base
instructor pay on the nun1bcr of students in the instructor's class.20G They
use technology to n1inin1izc incfiicicncics in adn1inistrativc operations, such
as in ac\n1issions. '2° 7 Sonic proprietary schools pron1ote efficiency by
calculating optin1al £3.cilitics usage ratios. 20 B These calculations help
institutions clctcrn1ine the size of their facilities and the types of leasing

20 I. De\11)' stock p1ice has r:iscn 11101-c than '.1,200'Yo since J 991. Compare Biggest 1, 000
Stock.r,
\V..\1.L
ST.
J.,
~o\'.
13,
2009,
at
C 7,
availabk
al
http:// ww\V. b:igcharls.co1n/ custo1n/ \v~jic/ \v~jbbhisto1ical.asp ?syn1b:::apol&dose_datc::: I I 0/o2Fl 3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O,
with
\VSJ.crnn,
Historical
Quotes,
Dc\!ry
Inc,
http://11'\V\1·.bigcharts.con1/custo1n/1vsjic/wsjbbhistorical.asp?syn1b:::l)\I &close_datc::: I 2°/o2Fl 011/o2FI 991&x:::I9&y::: I 0 (last \'isited J-\t1g. 4,
2010). Career Educa1ion Co1vorat:ion stock price has iisen 1norc than 750°/o since 1998.
Compare .,\';JSJJAQ. . .\'(i/ional .lfmkel h.wes, \VALL ST. J., ])cc. 10, 1998, at C9, rwailabl.e al
http: I I ww1 v. bi gch arts.cmn I cus lo 1n/ w~jie I 11·.~jbb-h islori cal .asp ?syn1b::: CEC O&dosc
_date::: I 2°/u2Fl 0°/o2Fl 998&x:::O&y:::O, with \'\'SJ.cmn, Historical Quotes, Career Education
Co1v,
http://\v11'\1·.b:igcharts.co1n/ct1ston1/1v~jic/1v~jbb
hisl01ical.asp?syn1b:::ccco&closc_da1e::: l I 0;iJ2Fl 3°/o2F2009&x:::O&y:::O (last visited .!-\ug. +,
2010).
202. R_L:ctt, .rnjJm note 110, at 76 (citing· "Scale Econoinies and Operating Efficiencies''
as onr of seven ''lngrcdicnls for Profitability" for proprietary schools).
20'.~. Id. at 88.
204. See id. at 118-19 (stating that although the faculty ·'arc the center of acade1n:ic life,"
the president is expected to 1naintain 111anagcrial control 01·cr decision nutking).
205. See id. at 119 (noting the apparent ''lack of a tenure systcn1 al ·for-profit
universities").
206. Goldie Bltuncnstyk, Ussons fiwn For-Prqfit l11stit11tions About Culling College Co.>ls,
CHRON. I-IJGHER EDUC., .June 5, 2008, hup://chron:icle.con1/articlc/For-Profit-CollegesSharc-L/867 /.
207. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sdingo, Li. q/ Plweni:r. Owe.> ·Raj;id Growth lo [i'.\e ef Tedmology, ]ls
President Stgis, CHROl\". HIGHER Eouc., June 17, 2005, at J-\23, available at
http:/ /chron:iclc.con1/arlicle/C-of-Phoenix-Owcs-Rapid-Gr/3394/ (reporting that 4·0°/o of
all adn1issions decisions by the Cnivcrsity of Phoenix arc "made without hu1nan
:intervention").
208. Facility costs arc the second largest expense incmTcd by prop1ietary schools, behind
sala1ics. Blumcnstyk, .>upra note 206.
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agreements they enter. 2o~J
Enrolln1cnt n1anagcn1cnt, ho\vcvcr, is the prin1ary n1cthod that
proprietary schools use to pron1otc cfficicncics.210 Like all institutions,
proprietary schools need stuclcntsi but their need is 1norc intense than that
of n1ost nonprofit schools. 211 ~1Iost nonprofits arc able to subsidize their
expenses \vith non-tuition revenue, such as cndovvn1cnt incon1c or public
appropriations. Proprietary schools, ho\vcvcr, do not benefit fro111 such
subsidies. ;\s a result, each student represents a revenue strcan1 that
directly affects the con1pany's botton1 linc. 21 2 As such, these institutions arc
under intense and constant pressure to increase enrolln1ents. 1\nd given
this pressure, it should be no su11Jrisc that in1proprietics in the sector aln1ost
ahvays bear sonic relation to institutions' cnrolln1ent n1anagen1ent
functions.

G. EmjJhasis on Recruitment
Adn1issions representatives at proprietary schools arc essentially
salcspeople.2I'.{ At many proprietary schools, the nun1ber of adn1issions
representatives is greater than full-tin1e faculty. 21 -l- Proprietary schools also
invest heavily in advertising;2 15 anyone \·vho has ever vvatched daytin1c or
late-night TV can attest to this. In fact, rccn1itment and marketing
expenses typically chvarf the total salaries paid to faculty.21ti Proprietary
school advcrtisen1ents often portray education as the path to a career and
to financial security-and the advertising institution as the ideal provider of
that education.
Unfortunately, 111any of the electronic and h11n1an
representatives of proprict<'try schools proffer n1isrepresentations as a 111eans

209. This approach to n1anaging space diOCrs son1cwhat Cron1 that oC 111ost nonprofit
schools, as these schools arc oficn inccntidzcd to own their facilities and expand such
holdings. id.
'210. See RUCH, s11j1ra note l 10, at 88 (discussing how proprietary schools track class
enrolhncnts closely and rnake ac\jusl111cnts accordingly}.
211. See, e.g., l(JRP, supra note 87, at 242 ("Increasing cnrolhncnt has !O be the
para111ount concern for any for-profit universily, especially one whose stock is publicly
traded.").
212. See id. at 242, 247 (claiming that for-profit universities, such as Dc\lry, have higher
tuition and n1ust use aggressive markeling and recruiting to bring in prospective students).
213. See id. at 247 (explaining that fOr schools with 111ultiple campuses, these individuals
arc often responsible for recniiling on behalf of c1ll schools within a particular region).
214. Anti-Fraud liemings, supra note 10, at 8 (statc111ent of Rep. J\tlaxine 'Vatcrs).
215. Id.
216. Id. ("The amount spent on advertising, lead creation, recruiting, and admissions
representativc5 far exceeds the salaries paid to faculty.").
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of inducing cnrolln1cnt. 217 The primary targets of these n1isrcprcscntations
arc people \vho arc n1ost susceptible to being fooled by thc111 and n1ost
likely to reap the negative effects of an unsuccessful educational experience.
Therefore, a clear in1pcrativc to prevent schools from inducing cnrolln1cnt
using n1isrcprcscntations exists.
IV. THE NEED FOR TIGHTER REGGLATIO:'\ Of HIGHER Em;C-\TIO:'\
RECRUTJllE:'\T A:'\D MARKETL\G

'fhc typical proprietary school student is undertaking education for very
pragn1atic rcasons-n1ost often, earning a degree that \vill soon result in a
\vcll-payingjoh.2 18 Cognizant of their niche, proprictaI)-' schools have clone
a convincing job of characterizing thcn1selves as effective, if not obligatory,
intcrn1ccliaries bct\vccn job seekers and the job n1arket.2 1 ~ 1 i\nd both
through their advertiscn1cnts and their rccruitn1cnt practices, proprietary
schools use the singlc-n1incled dctern1ination con1n1on an1ong their students
to their advantage. Take for exan1ple the follo,ving jingle, \.vhich is sung in
very catchy fashion on a television con1111ercial for a co111pany that n1arkets
onlinc progra111s for proprietary schools. 220 The lyrics arc \.Vritten fron1 the
perspective of a prospective student:
1'111 \vorking for an hourly \vage
I \Vent to high school didn't do great
Still I gotta n1ake n1orc cash 1nore education is \vhat 1'111 looking at
\Vhcn I get a clcgTcc, l \vill 1nakc a bigger salary
So nu\\' I've got to sec \·vhich college is right for n1c
I \vent on the in1ernct and found Education Connection
l took son1e free tests to find out n1y direction
1'111 taking n1y classes onlinc getting 111y degree on 1ny O\\'n ti1nc
Education Connection 1natchcd n1e \Vith the rig·ht college for free!~~r

The lyrics touch on all the con1n1on thcn1es utilized by proprieta1y
schools 111 pursuing their n1arket, including n1onctary benefit and
convcn1cncc.
fv1orcovcr, the con1n1ercial is replete \vith graphical
statcn1cnts, such as "Niakc $25,000 Niorc Each Ycar."222

217. See K..JRI', s11jira noLe 87, at 2'1·2 (admiuing that because recruiters arc expected to
n1eet enrolbncnt quotas, that they son1eti1nes oversell the school ;.uid "skirtO the border of
tnisrcprcsentation ").
218. See, e.g., id. at 245.
219. See Linehan, .rnj1ra note 7, at 757-58 ("Students generally view prop1ictary schools
as the gatekeepers to their trade ofehoiee .... ").
220. YouTube.co111, Education Conncctio11 "Get Connected" TV ConunereiaJ,
hllp:/ /www.youtube.corn/watch?v:::::7aOwatOC2clfd (last visited Aug. 4, 20 I 0).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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77ie Susceptibilities oj"Lfze 1'1arket

Given the educational niche proprietary' schools have carved out, the
111ost con1n1on targets of propricta1y school advcrtiscn1cnts arc poor,
undereducated, and oldcr.'.!23 Individuals \vho fit this profile arc highly
susceptible to being persuaded by n1isrcprcscntations due to their lack of
insight about higher cducation.'.!:! 4 Unlike t)1)ical students at traditional
colleges and universities, n1ost proprietary school students arc firstgcncration college students. '.!'lj This lack of educational experience li111its
their ability to discern honest clai111s fro1n clcccptivc ones. They arc 111orc
likely to finance their education 'vith student loans and eventually default
on those loans. 22 r; 1"'hcy arc least likely to con1plain about unfair conduct to
,vhich they have been subjectcd,227 and even for those vvho do con1plain,
current safeguards arc inadequate in pro,.~ding effective ren1edies.2211
Assurances that an educational progran1 'vould quickly lead to a 'vellpaying job arc very con1pelling. Add a lack of higher education exposure
and a burning desire to escape poverty to the equation, and it becon1cs
clear \Vhy n1isrcpresentations concerning graduation and placen1cnt rates
arc so dangerous.
B.

The Costs of Failure

Proprietary schools arc relatively expensive to attend. ' Vhen compared
to public and private institutions, proprietary schools charge by far the
highest average tuition for non-degree and t'vo-year degree progran1s.22~i
Additionally, the average tuition for bachelor's degree progran1s at
proprietary schools is higher than the average public school tuition, though
slightly Io,ver than private school tuition.2::10 'T'hese high tuition rates have
encouraged high levels of borro,ving an1ong proprietary school students.
Sevcnty-t"vo percent of proprietary school students finance their education
(at least in part) 'vith Stafford loans; this is the highest percentage in higher
education.:ni The average an1ount of these loans is S5,800 for proprietary
1

223. Sec, r.g., Linehan, supra nole 7, at 757 {explaining the t}1Jes of advertising that
proprietary schools use when focusing on certain demographics).
22'k See. e.g., id. at 757-58.
225. A111i-.F'raud I lcmings, ;,upm note 10, at 46 (slalcn1cnl of l'\ick Glakas, "Presidcnl, Career
College Association).
226. See, e.g., GAO, S"J'RO.'\GER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, at 28.
227. See, e.g., FOSTER, .wjJra note 23, at 24·.
228. See Linehan, supra note 7, at 754 (alleging that the current legal doctrine fails to
protect students fron1 the schools' predatory practices).
229. K..'\APP E·1· AL, supra note l 93, at 6.
230. Id.
231. See CHR!STL\'A CH ..\,.'\G ''VE! ET AL., l\~AT'I. CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT!STJCS, U.S. DJ·:P'T
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school students; once again, the highest in higher cc\ucation.'.l:tz It is no
vvondcr that \vhilc proprietary school undergraduates only account for 8°/o
of students in higher education, they account for 18°/o of the loan
volun1c. 2'.1 3
The da\-vnsidc of these high borro-\ving rates is n1anifcstcd n1ainly in the
high default rates an1ong iOnncr proprietary school students. Proprietary
schools account for a disproportionate share of student loan clcfaults. 2'.H In
2006, the sector's t\vo-ycar cohort default rate \Vas 8.6°/o, the highest in
higher cclucation. 2:i:i Default rates an1ong all borro\vcrs increase over tin1c,
but the increase is n1uch higher an1ong proprietary school borro,-vcrs.
1\hnost a quarter of proprietary school borro,vers default on student loans
,.vithin four years of entering rcpayn1cnt, greatly exceeding the public and
private school sectors. '.2:lG '"fhc effects of student loan defaults arc in1n1cnsc.
Individuals 'vho default acquire negative credit history that li111its their
ability to secure housing or other loans.2::1 7 They could also face incon1e
garnishn1ents and restricted cn1ployn1cnt options. 2:lB
And to the
disappointment of n1any, it is very difficult to discharge federal student
loans in bankruptcy.23!l For taxpayers, the costs of covering defaults arc
immense as \vcll. Taxpayers cover virtually all the expenses associated \Vith
defaulted loans, including interest, and the price tag is in the billions of
dollars. 2-rn
OF EDLC., :\CES 2008-179rcT, TRl~~DS J.'\ l~SDERGR.--\DL".--\Tl·: BORRO\\'L'\G II: FEDERAL
STCDE'.\'T
LO.-\:'\S
J.'\
I 995-96,
1999-2000,
A\"D
2003-04
19
(2008),
hllp:/ /nces.cd.go\·/pubs2008/2008 l 791-c\·.pc!f (!isLi11g borro\ving· percentages for public
two-year, public four-year, and pti\'a!c institutions in 200'.3-04- as l l'Y'n, 42°/o, and 53°/o
respectively).
232. Id. at 20 (listing average loan an1ounts fOr public two-year, public four-year, and
private not-lOr-profit institutions in 2003-200 J. as $3,400. $4,900, a11cl $5, J 00 rcspccti\·cly).
233. Id. at 21.
23+. GA.0, POORER OLTCU.\IES, .rn/H11 note !64, al 5.
235. GAO, STRO.'\GER O\'ERSIGHT, s11jJl't1 nole !3, al 13 (sl<lting that the public and
pri\·ate nonprofit sectors had rates of 4. 7'~'n and 3°/n respectively).
236. See id. at 15 (pro\'iding a four-year default rate of ~tL'.1'Y\, Cur prop1ietary school
borrowers and 9.5°/o and 6.5'Vo for public and private school borrowers, respeeLi\'cly).
237. E.g., id. at 12.
1

238. Id.
239. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Educ., Federal Student A.id, Con11non Disputes JnyoJ\'ing
Defaulted Student Loans, hup:/ /w\vw.ed.go\'/ offiecs/OSFAP/J)CS/disputes.hl1nl#
Bankruptcy (last visited Aug. 4-, 20 I0) ("\Vhcther a bankruptcy di5chargc relieves an
individual or his or her obligation to repay a student loan or grant overpay1nent is now
deLennined by whether a court has ruled that repay1nent would i1nposc an undue hardship
on the bor:rO\ver and his or her dependents.'').
240. See 011enighi !Jeming 011 the Department ef Education: f Iemings Before the Subcomm. on Iluman
Resources and lntergo11emme11tal Rel.a lions ef the II Comm. on Gouemment Refonn and Ovenight, 1O+th
Cong. 15 ( J 995) (state1nent of Richan] \V. Riley, Secretary of Education).
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Given the disadvantaged backgrounds fron1 \vhich proprietary school
students often con1c, these students lack the social clout and political
sophistication necessary to foster \vidcsprcacl disn1ay regarding their
victin1ization.
They arc less likely to even con1plain about fraud
perpetrated against thcn1 by proprietary schools.'.!-l-I Even for those \Vho
con1plain, current legal and regulatory processes provide fc,v options for
redress. '.!-t'.!
V. ].'\.illEQl:.\TE SAFEGL\.IWS

The prominence of higher education institutions makes them frequent
targets of la\vsuits. The diverse nature of this litigation represents a virtual
111icrocosn1 of An1crican jurisprudence.
But in adjudicating disputes
involving higher education institutions, courts have been rather consistent
about their reluctance to intrude upon the inner \Vorkings of these
institutions. This reluctance has been termed acaden1ic abstention.2+::1 The
concept has been applied in cases involving all types of educational
institutions, and its fundamental pren1ise is the judiciary's belief that the
professional judgment of educators should be protected fron1 the
unqualified assessn1ents of judges or other fact finders. Paladino v. Adelphi
[iniversi{y2++ illustrates this reasoning: The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant institution failed to adequately educate his child, but the court
disn1issccl the case in large part because acljudicating it \vould have required
the "fact finder to enter the classroon1 and detern1ine \Vhether or not the
judgn1ents and conduct of professional educators \·Vere deficient."2+-'> The
court \Vas loath to evaluate the "con1plex educational dctcrn1inations"
nlade by the defendant.2+ti 'l'his type of judicial reluctance can greatly
disadvantage plaintiffs by lin1iting the circun1Stances in \vhich they can \vin,
or even seek, recovery for dan1ages.
PlaintiIT<; use tort lav,1 and contract la\V frequently as bases upon \Vhich to
sue educational institutions, but both provide only narrO\V paths to recovery
in cases \vhere inisreprcscntation or fraud is alleged.

2'1-1. 5'ee FOSTER, supra note 23, al 2+ ("[L]cgal aid attorneys believe that 1nosl students
who have been n1islcd by institutions do nol cmnplain; and, as a result, the nu1nbcr of
co1nplaints is not an adequate indication of the level of fraud and abuse perpetuated by
son1e for-profit institutions.").
242. Linehan, s11j1n1 note 7, al 764.
2'~3. See id. ("[Ilhc doctrine of acadcn1ic abstention rcOccts courts' ... reluctance lo
delve into the operation of educational institutions .... ").

244. 454 XY.S.2d 868 (App. Di,·. 1982).
2'1-5. Id. at 873.
2'1·6. Id. at 872.
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Tortlaw

In tort la\·Y, the n1ost logical cause of action for victims of proprietary
school fraud sccn1s to be fraudulent misrepresentation. Generally, a target
of a fraudulent n1isrcprcscntation n1ay recover clan1agcs if the n1akcr of the
misrepresentation knc\v or should have kno,vn that it \Vas false or baseless
(scicntcr) 2 ~ 7 and the target justifiably relied on the n1isrcprcscntation to his
dctrimcnt. 2"1 8 In order for the target's reliance to be justified, the
n1isrcprcscntation n1ust be n1atcrial-or in other \·Vords, the person n1aking
the 111isrcprcscntation n1ust kno\\' or should kno\v that the target \·vill
"attach in1portancc to [the n1isrcprcscntation] in determining his choice of
action in the transaction in question ... "2-t!l Additionally, liability can
attach \·vhen the n1aker of a niisrepresentation knovvs or should kno\v that
the target vvill rely on the n1isreprcscntation, even if a reasonable person
\vould not. 2·'i 0
A typical scenario during \vhich an adn1issions representative induces a
student to enroll based on tu~justifiably rosy future job prospects scen1s to
The
comprise a textbook case of fraudulent misrepresentation.
representative b1ovvingly n1akcs a representation that is baseless, if not
fraudulent, in order to induce cnrolln1cnt, vvhilc the representative knovvs
that the target vvill justifiably attach importance to the virtual pron1isc of a
\vell-paying job. Hovvever, courts arc reluctant to a\vard dan1agcs to
plaintifii;; in fraudulent n1isrcprcsentation cases against educational
institutions; ty1)ically, only the 111ost barefaced instances of fraud arc
successful. 2·" 1 The prin1ary difficulty plaintiffs face in these cases is proving
scicntcr on the part of the dcfendanr.2.12 In representing future job
prospects, proprieta1y schools arc able to hide behind the fact that niuch of
vvhat dctcrn1ines a graduate's job prospects is outside of the school's
control.2Y~ At least one court has characterized such representations as "no
n1ore than a prophecy," in highlighting the lin1itcd po\ver schools have in
securing en1ployn1cnt for their graduates. 2.'i-t But this vic\v allo,vs schools to
111akc baseless fonvard-looking clain1s vvith in1punity by shielding the111 on
the back encl, vvithout restricting their representations on the fi·ont end. 2.'is
RESTATEl'dE1'T(S1·:co~n) OF TORTS§ 526 (1977).
248. Jd.§537.
249. Id. § 538(2)(a).
250. Id. § 538(2)(b).
251. See, e.g., Linehan, sujJI"(/ nolc 7, at 770 (discussing the heightened pleading
requirements for con1plainls alleging intentional fraud).

24"7.

252.

Id.

253. Id.
254. Schwitters v. Des 1'1oincs Con11ncrcial Coll., 203 N.,V. 265, 265 (IO\\'a 1925).
255. See Linehan, supra note 7, at 768 (''By pron1ising outcon1es which in some way
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It seems that acadcn1ic abstention has fostered reluctance on the part of
judges to critique \vhat an1ounts to sales pitches) due to the tangential
relationship of these pitches to the educational process.
Therefore,
fraudulent n1isrcprcscntation fails to provide a ,,lablc avenue of redress for
n1ost victi1ns of proprietary school n1isrcprcscntations.
In addition, plaintiffs alleging negligence have been largely
unsucccssful. 256 For this discussion, the l\VO n1ost rclc\'ant negligence clain1s
arc negligent n1isrcprcscntation and educational n1alpracticc. In order for
a negligent 1nisrcprcscntation clain1 to be successful, the plaintiff 1nust sho\v
that the clefenclant, \vhile acting in a business or professional capacity,
supplied false inforn1ation that \Vas negligently obtained or con1n1unicatcd,
upon \vhich the plaintiff justifiably relied to his dctrin1ent.2·17 Educational
malpractice is pren1iscd on the clain1 that the institution failed to provide
the plaintiff an adequate education, thereby causing harn1, such as failure
to prepare the plaintiff for cn1ployn1ent. 2.'iH
Both clain1s tend to fail because courts arc reluctant to in1pose a duty of
care upon educational institutions for their student outcon1cs. For instance,
in Tolnlan v. CenCor Career College:,~ Inc., 2·19 a group of forn1cr students of the
defendant institution asserted various negligence clain1s relating to the
quality of the education they received and the advertisen1ents used by the
clefcndant. 21 ;11 In disn1issing all of the negligence clain1s, the court cited the
"collaborative and subjective process through \.vhich education is
undertaken and the "outside factors" that detcrn1ine a student's level of

depend on student ability, labor clc111ancl, or other factors outside thC' C'ontrol or the school,
the school can e1nploy deceptively persuasi\·e statcn1cnts about the benc/its to be reaped
fron1 their progra1n with lit Lie threat
liability under a fi:·audulcnl tnisrcprcscntalion ton
action.").
256. Generally, negligent conduct can be rouucl where
(a) an act which the actor as a rcasonabk 1nan should recognize as involving an
unreason abk 1isk of causing an in\·asion or an interest of another, or (b) a !~lilure lo do
an act which is necessary Cor the protection or assistance or another and which the
actor is under a duty to do.
H.. EST.-\TE.\IEXl' (S1-:c:oxn) OF TORTS§ 28:J. (1965j. :>:egligence lawsuits against proprietary
schools usually allege that Lhc school failed to pro\'ide training or education it had a duly to
provide.
257. See, e.g., .A1naral \·. A1n. Sch. or Correspondence, 107 F. App'x. '1-97, 4-98-99 (61h
Cir. 200'1-).
258. Sec, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Uni\·., 95 7 F.2d 410, 4 I 2 (7th Cir. l 992).
259. 851 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1992).
260. Specifically, Lhc clain1s alleged negligence in infonning plaintilTs or the type of
education they would receive, negligence of a specialist in technical education, and
negligence based on derendants' failure to avoid false or misleading advertising. Id. at 20405.

or
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succcss. 2G1 The court concluded that "there is no vvorkablc standard of
care" that could be in1poscd upon schools. 2(i 2 1\nd of course, \Vithout a
heightened standard of care or duty, no negligence clain1 can stand.
J\!Iorcovcr, courts have aln1ost universally rejected education n1alpracticc as
a recognized cause of action.'..'t;:i They have cited various public policy
considerations as reasons for this broad rcjcction. 2(i-J- But the failure of both
educational n1alpracticc and negligent n1isrcprcscntation can be traced
back to the judicial reluctance that characterizes the acadcn1ic abstention
doctrine. '..'(;.J

B. Contract Lau:.-'
Breach of contract suits stand a better chance of success than those
asserting negligence; this is because it is generally settled that the
relationship benveen a student and his or her educational institution is
contractual in nature. 2Mi
Promises made by an institution or its
representatives arc binding. 2<' 7 Catalogs and other n1aterials made available
to the student by his institution help define the contours of the contractual
rclationship.268 If certain pro111ises arc not kept by the institution, the
student could have a claim of breach of contract. 2i;9 In Ross v. Creighton
Universi!J, a forn1er student-athlete brought a lc.nvsuit clain1ing that the
defendant institution failed to provide pron1ised tuto1ing services and other
acadcn1ic accon1n1odations.'..' 11l 'fhe court allo\vcd the plaintiffs contract
26 J. Id. at 205.
262. Id.
263. Ros:,, 957 f.2d <ll "~12, '1-14, +16 (characte1izing educational n1alpracticc dai111s as
"bclo\·cd of conunentators, but not of courts," and identifying l\Jontana as the only slate
that allows educational 1nalpraeticc clain1s to go (()l"•sard).
26+. See, e.J;,., id. at '1·l+ (discussing reasons courts have rt'.jcctcd educational 1nalpracticc
as a cause ofaetion, including the lack ol"a standard of care, uncertainty about the cause and
nature 0Cda1nages, the potential kn· niass litigation, and the possibility that courts would be
forced to oversee the operations or schools).
265. Linehan, supra note 7, at 771.
266. \Vickstron1 \". X. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d lSS, 157 (Idaho 1986) ("There seen1s to be
alrnost no dissent fro111 the proposition that the relationship [between institution and
student] is contractual in nature.").
267. CcnCor, Inc. v. Tohnan, 868 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 199'1-).
268. Ross, 95 7 F.2d at 416.
269. /d.at417.
270. Ross was a basketball player who entered Creighton \\~th known acadc111ic
deficiencies. In his con1plaint he averred that Creighton breached its pro111ise to provide
Ross ''an opportunity lo participate, in a 111caningful way, in the acaden1ic progran1 or the
'Cni\Trsity despite his aeaden1ic background" in return for his promise to play basketball.
'fhc breach arose fron1 Creighton's alleged failure to provide Ross with tutoring services, an
opportunity and directive to take advantage of those services, an athletic redshirt that would
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clain1s to proceed because they could "point to an identifiable contractual
pron1isc that the defendant failed to honor."211
The Ross court's cn1phasis on specific pron1iscs is central to ho\v the

propriety of these types of cases is assessed. The court articulated a
standard for \vhcthcr a contract claim of this sort can stand: \Vhcthcr ruling
on the issue \vould require the court to delve into the nuances of
"educational processes and theories" or allO-\\' it to 1nakc "an objective
assessment" of \vhcthcr the institution failed to n1akc good on pro111iscs.212
If the allegation requires the former, it cannot stand; if it allo"vs the latter, it
can be pursued on the n1erits. 21 ::i The forn1cr approach \voulcl, of course,
run afoul of the acadcn1ic abstention doctrine, \vhilc the latter \vould not.
Unfortunately, the practical effect of this approach is sin1ilar to the effect on
tort clain1s; institutions arc allovved to n1akc n1isrcprescntations that arc
clear in their in1plications, but vague enough to evade legal obligation. J\s a
result, \vhen a student suffers dan1ages arising fron1 these legally vague but
practically convincing misrepresentations, options for redress arc li1nited.

C.

Consumer ProLecLion

State consun1er protection statutes theoretically provide avenues for
redress, as practically every state allo,vs victin1s of fraud to sue for
clan1ages. '.U.JSo1ne states even have consu1ner protection statutes
specifically addressing the operation of proprietary schools.27J Ho,vcver,
the standards of proof required by these statutes often n1ake \Vinning
dan1ages difficult fOr victin1s. 21 fi Son1e of these statutes require victin1s to
prove scicnter and proxin1ate causc,2 77 creating the san1c difficulties

allow hin1 lo better focus on acadcn1ics, and funds lo attain a college degree. Id. at 4 I 6.
27 L Id. at '1·17.
272. Id.
273. See id. (dis111issing the plaintiffs negligence dai1ns while prese1ving his contract
daiins).
274. Sheila B. Schcucnnan, 17ie Consumer Fraud Clas.1· Arlivn: R1'i11i11g in :Jbure b] Rtq11iri11g
Pfaintjifs lo Allege Reliance as an Ersenlial Element, 43 l-It\R V.J. O:'\ LEGlS. I, 23 (2006); sec alw Jon
l'vlizc, Con11nent, Fencing Off the Path q/Least Re.n:1'/a11re: Rc-E<amini11g the Roll' ef Li!tk FTC Act
Actions in the l11w qf FaL1e Ad11erl1Ji11g, 72 TEN:'\. L. Rt-:\·. 653, 660 (2005) (listing "treble
dainages, punitive dan1ages, statutory 1ninin1un1 da111agcs, and attorney's fr'cs" as the n1ost
con1n1on da111agrs allowed by state consumer fraud statutes).
275. See, e.g., Utah Div. of Conswner Prol., Postsecondary Proprietary Schools,
hup:/ I consu1ncrproteclion.utah.goy/reglstrations/schools.ht1nl {last Yisitcd Aug. +, 20 I 0).
276. Linehan, supra note 7, at 776. But sec i\Jize, Jupra note 274, at 661 (characterizing
stale consun1cr fraud statutes as "the path of least resistance" in suits alleging false
advertising).
277. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Jvfichcner, 584A.2d 973, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (''A.clual fraud
has five elements which n1ust coalesce. There n1ust be (I) n1isrcprcscntation of a 111atcrial
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dcsc1;bcd earlier. Also, hcc<Jusc some states lin1it attorney's fccs,2 7Hit n1ay
be difficult for son1c victin1s to find la\v·ycrs \villing to litigate cases in \vhich
only a fc\V thousand dollars arc at issue.

D. 17ze "Triad"
J_.astly, victin1s of proprietary school fraud arc inadequately protected by
the ~fitlc J\1 oversight n1cchanis111-also kno\\'11 as the "triad." The triad
consists of the DOE, state regulatory bodies, and accrediting agencies. Its
purpose is to ensure "that the 'gate' to student financial aid progran1s open
only to those institutions that provide students \vith quality education or
training \Vorth the tin1c, energy, and n1oncy they invcst."'.! 7!1 ])QE's
prin1ary functions \vithin the triad arc to verify institutional eligibility for
Title I\1 funds2H 11 and to certify accrediting agcncics. 281 States provide
oversight in n1any \vays) including through higher education regulatory
agcncies) 282 as '\veil as through indirect n1cans such as consu1ncr protection
and con1n1crcc la'\vs.283 J\ccrccliting agencies certify institutions as having
1nct certain n1inin1um standards of quality. 28-l- Only institutions that arc
accredited by an agency certified by the DOE can receive Title IV aicl.2B.1
None of the con1pone1its of the triad provides nluch relief for victims of
prop1ictary school n1isrcprescntations. The DOE only provides a lin1itccl
111cchanisn1 for v:ictin1s to lodge con1plaints, 2BG and that n1cchanisn1 docs not

fact; (2) scienter; (3) intention by the dcclarant to induce action; (4)justifiablc reliance by the
party defl-audcd upon the n1isrcprcscntation; and (5) danu1gc to the party dcfrauck-d as a
proxin1atc result.").
278. See, e.g., FL.\. ST.-.\T. ~ 501.2105(1) (1998) (placing the awarding of attorney·s kcs
within the discretion of the trial judge).
279. G:\.O, E\"SL'RL\G QL.:.-.\LITY, .mjHa note 27, at "L
280. .c\.n cxa1nplc or this function is DOE\ tracking of cohort ckh1ult rates. id. at +.
281. See id. at 4-5 (noting that DOE ''ccnifles that such agencies arc reliable authorities
as to what constitutes quality education or training pro\·idcd by postsecondary institutions").
2B2. Ser id. at 5 (slating that these agencies arc often responsible for establishing
standards for regulation of higher education institutions).
283. See id. ("Other state agencies define certain consun1cr protection 1ncasures, such as
refund policies.
In the nonnal course of regulating co1nn1crcc, all slates require
postsecondary institutions to have a license to operate within their borders.'').
284. See id. at 5-6 (".l\ccrcditing agencies adopt criteria they consider to rcDect the
qualities of a sound educational progra1n and develop procedures for evaluating institutions
to dctcnnine whether they operate at basic levels of quality.").
285. Set id. at 11--6 (describing the accreditation process).
2B6. See .·lnti-Fmud Ilearings, supra note I 0, at 23-24· (statcn1cnt of Rep. 1v1axine \Vatcrs)
("fT]hc Dcpartrnent docs not investigate charges n1ade by students regarding
inisreprcsentations 111adc to inDucnce students to enroll ... [;] these federal regulations have
no private 1;ght of action, and can only be enforced by the Department, which docs not do
it.o.job.").
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include a private right to dan1agcs. 287 l\1orcovcr, fines and other sanctions
in1poscd upon schools by the DOE arc often inadequate disincentives to
unscrupulous bchavior. 2BB 1~hc shortcon1ings of state oversight have
already been discussed. 1\nd accrediting agencies often provide insufficient
and conflicted oversight of the institutions they ccrtify.2B~ 1 Such lax
oversight al!o,vs unscrupulous institutions to stay in operation and continue
to v:ictin1izc students.
VJ. REGCL\TJ:\'G HIGHER EDCCATIO:\' REPRESE:\'TATJO:\'S

The proposals presented in this section have a singular focus: to reduce,
if not prevent, incidences of misrepresentations made by proprietary
schools in order to induce cnrolhncnt. The proposals arc not focused on
deterrence per sc, as penalties against offending schools arc not presented.
Sin1ilarly, avenues of redress for victin1s of n1isrcpresentations arc not
directly proposed. Pragmatism is the n1otivation behind this narro"v focus;
the goal of this Part is to present solutions that account for the n1ultifaceted
nature of higher education oversight and the sensitive nature of con1mcrcial
speech regulation \·vithout getting bogged dovvn in their con1plcxity. As
such, the principle thrust of the proposals is to harness current regulatory
frame\vorks in nc\v ,.vays.
The proposals arc organized around t\·VO areas of focus: (1) proprietary
school n1arketing, and (2) recruitment. ' Vhile there is ovcrlap.bet,vccn the
t\VO areas, there arc certain distinctive halln1arks of each. For purposes of
this Article, n1arketing pertains to the efforts of proprietary schools to
pron1otc their progran1s to prospective students via \Viele-reaching n1cans.
1\dvcrtising, \Vhcther on television, online, or in print, is the principle
n1ethocl of proprietary school n1arkcting. Rccruitn1ent pertains to the
representations n1ac\c and 111ethocls used to enroll individual students. 'fhc
tactics of achnissions representatives arc central to this area of focus.
1

287. See Linehan, supra note 7, al 788 (noting that "nothing is done to coinpcnsatc the
victin1").
288. S(:e, e.g., Anti-Fraud l-Jearing.i, supra note I0, at 21 (staten1ent of Rep. l\Jax.ine \Vatcrs)
("[T]he school doing the defrauding inay be allowed to pay a few cents on the dollar to settle
clai1ns with llic Dcpa11n1cnt, or placed on rcitnbursc1nent status so that they have to wait 45
days for payn1ent of financial aid.").
289. See id. al 17 ("[T]here is a built-in conflict of interest will1 respect to accrediting
agencies, because they have no incentive to revoke accreditation since their incomc-strcain is
directly detcnnincd by the nun1ber of schools they accredit.").
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ProjJosals

To protect students and taxpayers fl-0111 n1isrcprcscntations and
in1propricty fron1 proprietary schools, tighter regulation of their n1arkcting
practices is necessary. First, proprietary schools should be required to place
disclain1crs on all advcrtiscn1cnts n1aking for\vard-looking clai111s. Second,
the Federal rfradc Con1n1ission should expand its regulations pertaining to
proprietary school advertising. Third, the FTC and the proprietary school
industry should encourage sclf-rcguhnion of proprietary· school advertising
practice. In addition to tighter regulation in the n1arkcting area, existing
regulation of proprietary schools' rccruitn1cnt practices should be
expanded. Specifically, proprietary schools should be required to n1akc
affinnativc disclosures and provide relevant labor niarkct inforn1ation to
students p1ior to enrolln1ent.

B. Relevant Oversight Agencies
Five types of entities play significant roles in regulating higher education
and con1n1crcial speech. These entities arc the DOE, the Federal 'T'radc
Con1n1ission (ITC), state regulatory agencies, accrediting agencies, and
self-regulatory bodies. Due to their integral role in the proposals, a brief
overvie\v of each entity's oversight function is necessary.

1.

Ille DejJarl!nenl (}/'E'ducaLion

The prin1ary role of the DOE \vithin higher education is to certify
institutional eligibility for 'l'itlc I\1 financial aid funds. In addition to
collecting va1ious forn1s of data and pro,.iding oversight of accrediting
agencies, the Departn1ent oversees entrance cxan1 publishers2'.lO and dictates
education policy. The DOE also accepts co111plaints filed by persons
"suspecting fraud, \vaste[,] or abuse involving [DOE] funds or
progran1s. "2'.ll

290. See, e.g., G.-\0, STRO.!\GER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, at 9-l l (slating that thC'
DOE is "responsible for overseeing Lest publishers" and setting standards).
291. t:.S. Dcp'l of Educ., Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Hotline,
http:/ /w,vw.cd.gnv/about/offices/list/oig/hotlinc.htn1l (last visited Aug. 4-, 20 l 0).

Number 3 •Volume 62 •Summer 2010 ·American Bar Association· Administrative Law Review
'"Your Results May Vary': Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through
Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations" by Aaron N. Taylor,
published in the Administrative Law Review, Volume 62, No. 3, Summer 2010.
© 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved.
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in
an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

2010]

2.

TIGHTER RECl "LJT!O.\" OFSCJ-IOOL ]~EPRE~F.\ 7JT/(J.\S

771

The Federal Trade Conunission

'The FTC is responsible for regulating and enforcing advertising Ja,vs.'.!~ 12
'rhc Con1n1ission is principally conccn1cd \Yith pron1oting fair con1pctition
through truth in advcrtising.'.!!l:l The ITC pron1ulgatcs both general and
industry-specific advertising standards, and it also assists industries in
developing their O\vn standards and best practices. '.!'l+ The FTC has c\cvisccl
guides that explain ho\v its rules arc applied to specific industries, '.2'l.'i
including one that addresses advertising practices of private vocational and
distance education schools. 2 ~Hi In pursuing sanctions against offending
advertisers, the FTC can bring Ja,vsuits and adn1inistrativc actions.:!!)/
'fhrough these actions, the FTC can seek va1ious for1ns of relief, such as
injunctions, corrective advertising, nlonctary penalties, and consun1cr
redress. :!9 B
3.

SLale Regulafo1)' Agencies

Every state has a higher education regulatory body that oversees the
operations of postsecondary institutions vvithin its borders. Son1c states
have agencies that specifically oversee proprietary institutions.:!9'l The
'29'2. See Patiicia P. Baiky, L'rifair Competition and Jiisfeading Arlui:rti-1·i11g: flow Adul.'rti.1i11g is
Rl'g11lated in llw lJnill'd Stall's, 5 11- A:'\TITRL:sT LJ. 531, 532 ( 19/Fi) (''Cong1Tss authorized the
agency ... to challenge 'unfair or decepti\·e acts or practices· to pron1otc truth in ackenising
and fr1ir 1ncrchandising practices. rfhe Corn1nissio11's goal is ... to ensure that consuincrs
receive both the infonnation necessary Lo inakc inforn1cd choices in the n1arketplace and the
opportunity to use that infonnation r/Tccti\·cly.
").
29'.3. See id. ("[T]he Cornn1ission in\·cstigatcs co1nn1crcial beh;_n·ior that n1ay be dccepti\T
· or unf<lir, including ackcrtising.
).
2~J4. O\·er the last two decades, the Federal Trade Co111n1ission {FTC) has gradually
shifted away frmn rulc1naking, !Ocu~ing instead on cnforccincnt. The reason !Or this shift is
that rukn1aking is seen as labor-intcnsh·c and controversial. R.ulnnaking is now typically
undertaken at the behest ofCong1Tss. Today, the ITC's p1in1ary 111ethod ofrulcn1aking is
the public workshop confl·rencc, where industry stakeholders (e.g., business entities,
consun1er groups, other federal agencies, and state law cnforcen1ent officials) arc brought
together lo discuss proposed rules changes. The input pro\·ided in these conferences help
infonn the rules prmnulgatcd by the FTC. See geneml!J' Lydia B. Parnes & Carol Jennings,
Ihrough the Looking G!aJs: .A Pcnj1ecth1i: 011 Regulalol)' Refbrm al the Federal Tmrle Comm£1.1ion, 49
AD.\IL\. L. REV. 989, 998-99 ( 1997) (describing the role of workshop con!Crences).
295. Id. at 992 n.l+ (noting that industry guides provide "an interpretation of the
underlying statute, but [do not afford] an independent basis for en/Orcemcnt action").
296. Guides for Private \locational and Distance Education Schools, 16 C.F.R. pt. 254
(2010).
297. See, e.g., Bailey, J11pm note 292.
298. Id. at 533.
299. For example, the Xorth Carolina Office of Proprietary Schools is a division of the
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extent of O\'Crsight provided by state higher education regulatory bodies
can be broad, cncon1passing operational aspects of institutions as \vcll as
institutional 1narkcting practices. ::ion Every state also has a consun1cr
protection agency that provides oversight of various aspects of con1n1crcc,
including advcrtising.::ioi
Son1c of these agencies have di\,isions that
specifically oversee proprietary institutions. :-;o~

4.

Jlccrediting Agencies

;\ccrcditing agencies assess and certify that institutions receiving Title IV
funds arc of suflicicnt quality. These agencies arc non-govcrnn1cntaP(n and
arc ty1)ically fanned by peer institutions seeking to devise and pron1otc
certain educational standards. 30 + These standards, ho\vcvcr, arc rarely
concrete, allo,ving individual schools to define their O\Vl1 missions. ·m.J
Federal Ja,v n1andatcs this flcxibility,:m(i though accrediting agencies arc
allovved to set standards that can trun1p institutional standards. :-1o 7
i\ccrcditation is voluntary; ho\vevcr, only accredited institutions can receive
1'itlc IV funds. :-108

State Board of Con11nunity Colleges.

X.C. Co1nn1unity Colleges, Proprietary Schools,
(last visited Aug.+, :.2010}.
300. Set, l'.g., LT...\H CODI·: A:\:\. § 13-'.14-IOB (2009) (requiring fair and accurate
111arkcting practices and Ii.ill disclosure or relevant institutional infonnation before any
applicant enrolls in a Ctah proprietary school).
30 I. .5ff, t'._!f,., Scheuennan, .rn/Jm note 274-, al 23 & nn.JGJ-·62.
'.102. Sec, e.g., Ctah Div. of Consun1cr Prot., supra note 27S (pro\"iding instructions !Or
postsecondary proprietary schools Lo con1plctc registration with the Utah Di\·ision or
Consu111cr Protection, as required by state law).
303. In n1ost countries, accreditation is a govcnH11c11tal li.mction. Ho\l'ever. concerns
abnul !Cckralisin ha\·e pro1npled Congi-ess lo place the responsibility ofinslitutional ciuality
assessrnent in the hands of these p1ivate entities. There arc about 3,500 accredited
institutions nationwide, and the vasl n1ajority ofthen1 an.' for-pro!i.L FOSTER, supm note 23,
at 18.
304-. G.1\0, E.'\SC!Ui\G QUALJTY, supra note 27, at 5-6.
305. See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 2'.3, at 19.
306. 20 C.S.C. § !099b(a)(5)(A) (2006} ("L1]hc standards for accreditation o/"the agency
or association assess the institution's success with respect to student achievement in rcblion
to the institution's n1ission ... " which 1nay include di!Tercnt standards for difICrent
institutions or progra1ns, as established by the institution.}.
307. DRE\'KER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, EDCCATJON LAW ALERT: HlGHER EoL:CATIO.'\
OPPORTL:NJTY .!\Gr FINAL RcLE-ACCREDITJi\G .AGE.'\CY RECOG;\"JTJO:'\ 1 (2009),
http:/ I w>vw.d1inkerbiddle.eo1n/ liles/Publication/88e5ba42-9a l 2-4632-b4· l 609b:3a 151 Od27 /Prescntation/PublieationAttachmcnt/ 4-3c2b066-fc38-48e 7-bbfcOa2 7d I e85586/l-Iighcr_Eclucation_Opportunit.pdf.
308. See, FOSTER, supra note 23, at 2, 4.
hllp://www.neec~.ce.nc.us/Prop1ietary_Sehools/
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Bodies

\Vithin the rcaln1 of advcrtising 1 vanous self-regulatory bodies pro111otc
good advertising practices. :·HJ!I Generally, the pu11)oscs of self-regulation arc
t\vofold: to pro1notc a set of industry norrns and best practices, and to
provide a n1cans of applylng and enforcing these norn1s.:~ 10 As it concerns
advertising, self-regulation is also intended to protect consun1crs and foster
fair con1pctition-n-\·o goals that arc highly co1npatiblc \Vith frcc-n1arkct
idcals.:111 l_.ikc accreditation, participation in a self-regulatory schcn1c is
voluntary. In the n1ost developed arrangc111cnts, these bodies \Vork directly
\vith the FTC and state agencies in regulating advertising.:ll'!
C'. J)iscussion

Proprietary schools invest heavily in n1ass n1edia advertising. They
spend upv1 ards of one billion dollars each year pron1oting their
progran1s.:1i3 Their con1n1ercials don1inate non-pri1ne-tin1e television, and
their online ads seem on1nipresent. 3 H But \.vhen it corncs to advertising,
proprietary schools suffer fron1 a problcn1 con1n1on an1ong all educational
institutions: their procluct--.,··education--is largely intangible.:i1.1 In n1ost
cases, the only tangible n1anifestation of education is the diplon1a that is
received upon con1plction. In attempting to sell their product and
differentiate thcn1sclvcs fro1n con1petitors, nonprofit institutions often
pron1ote tangible ancillaries to the educational experience, such as
1

Silt geneml{y Bailey, .1upm note 292.
Ixr'L CTR. FOR ALCOHOL POUCll·:s, ICAP H.EPORTS 9, SE!.F-REGL'L:-\TIU.'\ OF
BE\'l~R:\GI~ ALCOHOi, A.D\'EK"l'l.':il.'\G I (2001), hllp://\\'W\l'.icap.org/portals/0/do\vllioad/
all_pdfa/I CAP_Reports_English I rcporl9 .pelf Q1cTcinaftcr IC.t\P REl'UK i·sJ.
311. See, e.g., Baiky, .rnjJra 1101c 292, at S3i ("An often-stated goal or the self-regulatory
apparatus is to protect consun1ers f'ron1 decepti\T ackcrtising; there is no doubt in 1ny n1ind,
howc\'cr, that another in1portant goal sen-eel by il is to protect-ir not necessarily to
promote--f'air eon1pctition. ").
312. Sl'e id. (describing how the Xational Advertising Division of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus, Inc. and the Xational A_ckcrtising Review Board serve as \·aluabk
eon1ponents to state and federal O\'Crsight of' advcrlising).
313. Goldie Blun1cnstyk, Economic JJuwnlum i~ a Boon far For-Prqjil College.>, CHRO!\.
1-IJGl-lER EnL:c:., Dec. 10, 2008, hup://chronicle.eo1n/article/Eeono1nic-Downturn-Is-aBoon/ 1400/.
31 L lJOP alone is the seventh biggest onlinc adveniser. Goldie Blun1enstyk, J\Jarketing,
the For-Prefit H1<91, CHIU).'\. I-IJGHER Enuc., Dec. I, 2006, at .A.20, available al
http:/ I ehronicle.con1/ article/1.Iarkcting-the-For-Prolil- \Vay /6212 I.
315. See, e.g., A'iCTIL, .wpm note 105, at 31 (".Among the greatest challenges to
successfully 1narketing higher education is the inherendy intangible- nature of the very thing
that is being marketed.").
309.
310.

1
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attractive buildings and tangential student scrviccs_:}lli Proprietary schools,
ho,vcvcr, tend to take a different tack; they n1akc n1orc concerted efforts to
sell their products by tying thcn1 to tangible encl results, such as career
advanccn1cnt and financial stabiliry.:ii 7 It is on these t)1Jcs of for-..vardlooking ads that the FTC should require prominent disclain1crs.
Frcc-n1arkct con1pctition requires that con1n1crcial entities be allo,vcd to
con1n1unicatc \Vith consun1crs. 31 B 'l'hcrcforc, con1n1crcial speech is given
n1any of the san1c First A111cncln1cnt protections as regular spccch. 31 ~ 1 In the
scn1inal case, Viiginia Slate Board qf' l;Jhannac_y 1:. Tliiginia C'itize11s Conslaner
Council, the Supren1e Court re\~e\vecl the constitutionality of a \ 1irginia state
la\v banning phannacies fron1 advertising prices. ·i'.w The Supreme Court
struck do\vn the ban, reasoning that consun1ers in a free n1arket niust be
en1po\vctcd by the free ilo\·\' of inforn1ation_:i21 This case represented a
departure fron1 previous Court decisions suggesting that con1n1ercial speech
fell outside the purvie\v of First An1cncln1cnt protection. :1 77
In Viiginia State Board ef Pharmary, the Court insisted that First
316. Id. at 17 (arguing that in seeking market differentiation, ''[c]ollcges and universities
arc reduced to boasting of their multin1il\ion-dollar student recreation centers, [and] their
nouveau chic dining residence halls").
:317. ITT ollen features graduates discussing how receiving their ckgTees positively
affected not only their careers, but also their faini!y life. See, 1'.g., 1'viySpace.co1n, ITT Tech
Con11ncrcial: "If I 'Yant to Do So1nething ] \Vill Do l'dy Best to Accon1plish It,"
http:// vicls.inyspace .con1/indcx.ef1n?fuseaction:::vids.inclividual&VidcoID:::69 I J.OB
(lasl
visited June 27, 2010). Howe\·er, this is nol lo suggest that proprietary school ads only !Ocus
on careers and jobs. Proprietary school ads take a va1ie1y of approaches. In addition to ads
Lhal focus on end results, other ads lout co1nponents or an institution's suite of services, such
as those relating to student support. l:OP's ''I A1n a Phoenix" can1paigi1 provides exan1plcs
of this approach. Sn:_. r~.g., "Cnivcrsity of Phoenix, L:OPX on Tcle\·ision: I An1 a Phoenix,
http:/ /\nnv.phocnix.cdu/about_us/acl-can1paigi1s.hln1l (last \·isitcd Aug. 4, 20 l 0).
:31B. Pauline l'd. Ippolito, 11'7wt Can l·Vi.' Lcamjivm Food Ad1.·erti.1·i11g Polio' over the Lrul 25
l'Cm~r, J'.2 GEO. I\14.SO:\ L. RF,\·. 939, 9;)9 ('.2004') ("The ability of finns to speak to potential
conswncrs about i1nporlant product characteristics is an essential c!cn1cnt of co111petition-it
infOrn1s consun1crs and pushes linns lo offer better products.'').
319. Bolger\'. Youngs Drug Prods. Coq)., 463 t.:.s. 60, 66 (I 9B3) (specifying that speech
is cmn1ncrcial in nature when ( l) it is a paid-for ad\·ertiscn1ent (2) that rcCers to a specific
product, and (3) is published in the econo1nic interest of the speaker; however, the Court
indicated that not all three charactciislics arc necessary for speech to be considered
co1nn1ercial); \Ta. State Bd. of Pharn1. v. \ 1a. Citizens Consu1ner Council, 425 L'.S. 7'1-8, 761
(1976) ("[S]peech docs not lose its First ;\rnendn1cnt protection because 1noncy is spent to
project it, as in a paid advtrlisc1ncnt of one forn1 or another.").
320. Va. .S~all' Ed. qf P!unm., 425 l:.s. at 748.
321. Id. at 765 ("So long as we prescrYc a predmninantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large 1neasurc will be made through nun1erous private
economic decisions. It is a 1natter of public interest that those decisions ... be intclJigcnt
and well inC01mcd. To this encl, the free Oow of com1nercial information is indispensable.").
322. Id. at 753.
1
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Amcndn1cnt protections only extend to truthful and non-n1islcading
con1n1crcial spccch,:-1 2:i and in a later case, C:enLral Hudson Gas & Electric C'or/J.
v. Public Sei7Jice Conunission/i'2-t it explained that such speech can only· be
restricted \vhcn the govcrnn1cnt proves it has a substantial interest and its
restriction directly advances that interest in the least intrusive n1anncr
possiblc.:l2.'> In Central Hudson, the Court struck do,vn a Ne"' York State ban
on electric con1pany advertising. The Court reasoned that even though the
state had a substantial interest in energy conservation, the challenged
restrictions \vcrc "n1orc extensive than necessary"-and therefore could not
stand. :l2{i The holdings in both fliiginia State Board q/ Phannac_y and Central
Hudson affirn1 the Court's vic\v that the First 1\n1endn1cnt "favor[s] the
disscn1ination of truthful product inforn1ation over governn1cnt suppression
of ideas. "'.'i2i So any proposed regulation of proprietary school advertising,
including required disclain1ers, 1nust serve a co111pelling state interest and
be narro\vly tailored to serve that interest.

1.

Requiring Disclainiers

The Supren1e Court has \Yeighed in on the issue of disclain1ers. \Vhen
the Court struck do\vn a ban on attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar qf
Arizona, the state bar association argued that attorney aclvcrtisen1ents vvcre
inherently n1isleading due to the individualized nature of each potential
client's necds.:128 ~fhe Court vvas unconvineed, ho\vevcr, reasoning that
such a vic\v "assun1es that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize
the lin1itations of advertising.":t?!l The Court further reasoned that correct
but incon1plctc inforn1ation \vas better rcn1edied by more disclosure, not
less.:;;:-rn As such, disclai1ncrs arc preferred over broader restrictions on

'.123. Id. al 771 l''Unlruthful speech, con1nw1-cial or otherwise, has never been protected
fOr its own sake."); see afro In re lnt'l I-larvcstcr Co., I 04 F.T.C. 94-9, I 0."16 ( 1984) \noting that
clcccptivc ackenising "is hannful lo eonsun1crs, unclcnnines the rational functioning of the
inarkctplacc, and ... never oITcrs increased efficiency or other counte1Yailing benefits that
n1ust be consiclcrccl").
324. 447 C.S. 557 (19BOj.
325. Id. at 566 ("For corn1ncrcial speech to con1c within [Firsl Arncnchnent protection],
it at least 1nust concern lawful activity and not be 1nislcading. l'\ext, we ask whether the
asserted govcn1111cntal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
1nust dcten11inc whether the regulation clireclly advances the governincntal interest asserted,
and whether it is not inorc extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.").
326. Id. at 602.
327. Tom \la]uck, .:'Jote, K~eeping J)ictary Supplement Regulatiom· Slim and Fit: Finding a Ilealt/9·
Balance Between Patemalinn and Consumer Choice, 2 GEo.J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 285, 300 (2004).

328. 433 c.s. 350, 372 (l976j.
329. Id. at 374-75.
330. Id. at 3 7S.
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speech, such as bans.
Disclain1crs serve nvo basic purposes: to prevent deception and to
pron1pt advertisers to \vcigh the benefits of n1aking deceptive or incon1plctc
clain1s in light of the costs of the disclain1cr.:~ 31 In arguing for required
disclosures on fonvard-looking prop1ictary school ads, the author borro\vs
language fi-on1 the Bates Court and characterizes these ads as correct but
inco1nplctc. J-\s the con1n1c1Tials assert, higher levels of education arc
positively associated 'vith higher incon1c lcvcls.:n~ In that sense, the
inforn1ation is correct. 1~hc incon1plctcncss is in the suggestion that
co1nplction of the progra1n assures higher incon1c and that con1plction itself
is assured-or even likely. The association bet\veen education and inco111e
is not absolute, and as discussed earlier, n1ost proprietary school students
fail to persist to degree. Required diselain1crs \.Vould address the incon1plctc
trcatn1cnt of these realities. Regulation such as this \vould n1cet the test put
forth in Central !Judson: the state has substantial interests in protecting its
citizens fron1 n1isreprescntations and reducing the public costs thereof, and
disclain1crs directly addressing incon1plete inforn1ation \vould be the least
restrictive manner of senring these interests.
The ITC has required advertisers to use disclain1ers \.vhcn necessary to
prevent deception.:JT:;
Generally, clisclai111ers arc required to be
conspicuously placed and easy to understand.:tH These basic requiren1cnts
n1ake sense, because for a disclain1cr to be effective, it 111ust be noticed and
understood by consun1ers. In its orders, the FTC is often very specific
regarding the forn1, content, and placen1ent of disclosures. For instance, in
acljuclicating !11 re La Salle Extension lJniversi{y, the Con1n1ission found that the
respondent deceptively advertised its la\·v degree progran1 by not sufficiently
disclosing its lack of accreditation. :ns J\s a result, it ordered the respondent
to disclose the progran1's lin1itations \vith disclaimers "in type the sa111e size

331. Ippolilo, .rnj1m note '.'31B, al 950 ("[IZ]cquiring [disclai1ncrs] raises 1hr finn's cost of
rnaking the clain1s, and thr 'duller' of the added rcquiren1ents n1ay n1akc the clai1ns k:ss
cffcctiYe as a 1narketing 1001. Ir these effects arr significant, they reduce lirn1s' incenti\'t~S to
1nakc lhe clain1s at all.'").
332. See, e.,g., L'.S. lJep"t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stat.islics, Education Pays in lligher
Earnings and Lower l.:nen1ployn1cn! Rates, http://\v\1'\r.bb.go\'/e1np/ep_chan_OOl.htn1
(last visilcd Aug.+, 2010).
333. See, e.g., In re La Salk Extension L'niY., 78 F.T.C. 1272, 1284 (1971) ("\Vherc.
the n1erc offering of thr product or sen·ice !cads to deception ... we believe that it is
reasonable and necrssary to de1nand that a disclosure required Lo dispel the deception be
given equal pron1inence with the offer.").
334.

BUREAL: OF CONsL:.\IER PROT., FED. TR..-\DE COi\L\.l':\, DIETARY SL:PPLEi\IE\TS: t\i'\

AD\IERTJSJ!\'G

GUIDE

FOR

IXDUSTRY

6

(2001),

http://www.ftc.go\'/

bcp I cd u I pubs I business/ advI b us09. pdf.
335. 78 F.T.C. at 1272-73.
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and appearance as the ad\'crtising clain1s_":-!'.1G Further, the FTC dictated
the placcmcn(l:'ll and contcnf'l:'IB of these disclain1crs.
Sin1ilar rcquircn1cnts could be placed on fonvard-looking proprietary
school ads. In order to prevent deception, disclain1crs relating to lovv
con1plction rates and the relationship bct\vccn education and earnings
should be required con1poncnts of these ads. 1'hc follo,ving disclain1crs
could be placed on ads:
l\Iost students \\'ho begin acadcn1ic or training progran1s at this institution do
not co1nplcic 1hcn1.

Con1plcting the dct,,'1Tc/training docs not guarantee c1nployn1cnt or a higher
salary.

'rhcsc clisclain1ers should appear conspicuously on ads, using the san1e
font size and appearance as the advertised elairris. In television ads,
clisclain1ers could be displayed conspicuously on the screen or stated clearly
by the narrator. 3::i:i These disclain1ers \Vould be particularly necessary for
ads using consun1er testimonials, a con1mon 111arketing strategy for
proprietary schools. The clain1s of consun1er endorsers n1ust be "typical"
or a disclain1er is required_:1-1o Given proprietary school completion rates,
any consun1er endorser touting the benefits of attaining a degree is arguably
describing an atypical experience. I.astly, in determining 'vhether an ad is
deceptive, the FTC \-\~II consider the ad's effect on a reasonable n1cn1ber of
the targeted group-3·11 The previously discussed susceptibility of the targets

'.J:l6. id. al 1280-81.
'.·}'.17. Id. (requi1ing disclain1ers to be placed ''on the front page or CO\'cr and on each page
or any pron1otional 1natcrial or descripti\'l:: brochure wherein respondent's law courses or
law degrees arc n1cntioncd in typP the sa1nc size and appearance as the ad\·ertising dai1ns
appca1ing thereon").
338. Id. at 1281 (requiring disclain1ers to state that ''courses arc not recogni:-:ed or
accepted as sufficient education or legal training to qualiG1 the student to becmne a
candidate for achnission to the profession of law in any oflhc Slates in the t:nitcd States or
the District o/"Colun1bia").
339. A recent R.c1nington College con1111crcial ai1ing in the l\ashvillc, Tennessee area
displayed two disclai1ncrs, including one stating, "Individual results nla)' vary." rfhe
disclain1crs were displayed in very s1nall font and only appeared for ten seconds of the sixtyco1111nercial.
Vi1nco.com,
Ren1ington
College
Co1n1ncrcials,
sccond
http://www.vi1neo.co111/2901500 (last visited Aug. '1·, 2010).
3+0. ITC Guides Concerning l:se of Endorscn1cnt.s and Testi111oniais in Advertising,
Consun1cr Endorse1nents, 16 C.F.R. § '255.2(b) ('2010).
341. See John E. Villafranco & Andrew B. Lustiginan, Regulation ef J)ielal)' Supplement
Adverti1i11g: Cunenl Claims ef Interest lo ilie Federal Trade Commiuion, Food and J)mg Adminfrlmlion
and .1Vatio11al Advert1:ri11g Division, 62 Foon & DRCG LJ. 709, 723-24 (2007) (noting lhat "the
degree or sophistication of the target audience is a significant factor in detennining the
reasonable 1ncssage conveyed by the advertising" and explaining that the ITC has assessed
both higher and lower standards of reasonableness).
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of proprietary schools ads increases the need for disclain1crs.

2.

Expanding FTC Proprieta~'Y School Guides

In fostering good n1arkct:ing practices, including the systcn1atic use of
clisclain1crs, the F~fC should expand its Guides for Private \! ocational and
Distance Education Schools. 3-L' The ITC pro111ulgatcd the (;uidcs in 1972
as a means of advising "proprietary businesses offering \'OCational training
courses, either on the school's prcn1iscs or through distance education, ho,.,.
to avoid unfair or deceptive practices in connection \v:ith the advertising,
pron1otion, marketing, or sale of their courses or progra1ns.":H:l i\s such,
the
Guides
address
prohibitions
against
vanous
types
of
n1isrepresentations.:l-H- Hovvever, the Guides only pertain to proprietary
schools offering less than a hvo-year degTec.+tJ This lin1ited applicability
docs not reflect the current reality of proprietary school education. \'\.Then
the Guides \verc first enacted, very fe\v proprietary schools vvere offering
degree progran1s. Today, nlany of these schools offer degrees through the
doctoral level. 3-Hi In fact, at son1c of the largest proprietary schools, n1ost
students arc enrolled in degree-granting progran1s.:H 7 But irrespective of
their evolving pro,gran1n1atic focus, the n1arketing strategy used by these
schools has re111aincd rather consistent; they still tic their progran1s to labor
n1arkct success. Thus, the dangers that the Guides \vere enacted to address
have expanded beyond the scope of the Guides, necessitating a broadening
of that scope. :Hu
342. 16 C.F.R. § 254·(2010).
343. Private \"ocalional and Distance Educatiou Schools, Request kir Public
Co1nn1ents, 74 Feel. Reg. 37,973, 37,973 Uuly 30, 2009).
344. 'fhcse n1isrepresentations concern the description of the school, its accreditation,
the 1ransfCrability of credits, the content of ads and tcsti1nonials, teacher qualifications,
courses offcrccl, the availability or cn1ployn1cu1 and !"inaucial aid, and cnrollrncnt
qualifications. Id. at 37,973-74.
345. 16 C.F.R. § 254·(a} ("These Guides do not apply to resident prin1ary or secondary
schools or institulions of higher education offering at least a 2-ycar prognun of accredited
college level studies generally acceptable !Or credit toward a bachelor's degree.").
346. Sec GAO, STRO:'\GER OVERSIGHT, supra note 13, at 1 ("In recent years, the scale
and scope of proprietary schools h;-n-c changed considerably.
Traditionally focused on
ccrtificalc and associate prognuns ranging fron1 cosn1ctology lo n1cclical assistance and
business achninistration, proprietary institutions have expanded their offerings to include
bachelors, n1asters, and doctoral level prograins.").
34-7. See l(JRP, ;,upra note 87, al 241 (describing a "new breed" or proprietary schools
where the rnajority of students arc enrolled "in dcgTce progran1s !Or everything fron1 the
associate degree to the Ph.D.").
34-8. In July, 2009, the FTC requested public crnnn1ents on the (;uidcs "as part of its
systematic review of [agency] guides and regulations." In ll1e request, the FTC presented
eighteen questions relating to how the Guides can be n1adc n1orc cOCctivc. Kone or the
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Encouraging Se//:_Regulation

The proprietary school industry, \Vi th the cncouragcn1cnt of the ITC,
should forn1 a self-regulatory body to encourage good advertising practices
\Vithin the sector. Industry self-regulation is an in1portant con1poncnt to
FTC oversight and the overall prevention of fraudulent advertising. For
cxan1plc, the National Advertising Rcv:ic\v C:ouncil (NARC),:l- 1!1 an un1brclla
self-regulatory agency, has set advertising guidelines for various industryspccific self-regulatory agencies, including those relating to electronic
rctailing:rJo and children's aclvcrtising.:n1 ;\!so, the F"fC has incorporated
self-regulatory agencies into its regulatory fran1e\vork. The Children's
Advertising RcviC\V Unit (CARU) and the National Advertising Division
(NAD) of the Council of Better Business Burcaus 3·12 serve as initial rcviC\VCrs
of challenged advcrtiscn1cnts. If an advertiser docs not agree \vith a

questions directly related to expanding the scope or the Guides, though question three asks
about possible 111odifications. 74-Fed. Reg. at 37,973-75.
3 11-9. See Better Bus. Bureaus, Advertising Review Services, http:/ /w\\!\V.bbb.org/
us/ Ach'ertising-Review-Serviccs/ (last visited Aug. 4, 20 l 0) ("i-\n alliance or the Association
of Xational Advertisers, the A1ne1ican Association of Advertising A.gencics, the A1ne1ican
Ad\'crtising Federation and the Council of Heuer Business Bureaus. The :\ational
Advertising Review Council's (.:'\ARC) n1ission is lo roster truth and accuracy in national
advcrlising through voluntary self-regulation.").
350. See Better Bus. Bureaus, Electronic R.etailing Self-Regulation Progran1,
http://\v\1'\V.bbb.org/us/cleclronic-relailing-sclf-rcgulation-progT<lln/ (lasl visited ;\ug. 4-,
2010) ("[rhe Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation ProgTa1n]'s 1nission is lo enhance
consu111er confidence in electronic retailing.
ERSP provides a quick and dfrclivc
1nrchanisrn for t\·aluating, in\'cstigating, analyzingl,J and resolving inquiries regarding Lhe
truLhfulness and accuracy of the piiinary or core cflicacy or perfonnance clain1s that arc
co1nn1Lmicated in national dirrct response ach-ertising.'').
35 J. St'e
Better
Bus.
Bureaus,
Children's
.-\cl\'crtising
IZc\'ic\1·
"Cnit,
hup://www.bbb.org/us/childrcn-ad\'crtising-1-c\'itw-unit/ (last visited Aug. 4-, 2010) (''l1'hc
Children's Ach·r-nising Review L'nit (CA.R"C) of LilC' Council or Better Business Bureau~] is
the children\ an11 of" the acl\'crlising industry's scH'..rcgulalion syslc1n and evaluates childdirecled advertising and pro1notional 111.-ucrial in all 111cdia to ad\'ancc truthfulness, accuracy
and consistency with its Se[fRegulalol)' Program }Or ChiMrm's .ldvertiring and relevant laws.");
Better Bus. Bureaus, Children's Food and Beverage A.dvertising Initiative,
http:/ /,vw1v.bbb.org/us/ childrcn-rood-bcverage-ad\·crtising-initialive/ (last visited Aug. 4-,
20 I 0) (''The Initiative is a voluntary sclf-regulaLion prognun with many of the nation's
largest rood and beverage cOJnpanics as participants. The Initiative is designed to shift the
111ix of advertising n1essaging lo children to encourage healthier dietary choices and hcalLhy
lifestyles.").
352. See Better Bus. Bureaus, ~ational Advertising Division, hup:/ /wvvw.bbb.org/
us/us/national-advertising-division/ (lasl visited Aug. '1·, 2010) ("The n1ission of the ~ational
t\clvertising Division (~AD) of the Council of Beller Business Bureaus (CBBB) is to review
national advertising for truthfulness and accuracy and foster public confidence in lhe
credibility of advertising.").
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decision n1adc by CARU or N.A.D, it may appeal to the National
Advertising Rcv:ic\v Board (NARB). :t'i:"l In assessing challenged ads, the
FTC gives great \Vcight to precedent set by these quasi-judicial sclfrcgulatory agcncics.1"1-t
A proprietary school self-regulatory body could be chartered through an
in1partial agency such as the Better Business Burcaus. 355 'fhc body could
serve as a clearinghouse for best practices in industry advertising, as \vcll as
a place \Vhcrc ad-related co111plaints could be brought by consun1crs and
con1pctitors alike. Like C1\RU and NAD, the body could sc1V'c as an initial
arbiter of con1plaints, \vi th appeals going to NARR. The proprietary school
industry \Votild benefit greatly fron1 this type of self-regulation; it \vould
in1provc the sector's credibility \·vith the public \vhilc encouraging healthy
eon1pctition and possibly staving off closer govcrn111cntal scrutiny of its
advertising practices.

4.

Requiring Aj/hmalive Disclosures

The federal Student Right-to-.Kno\v and Can1pus Security Act requires
all institutions receiving Title IV aid to n1ake \Viele-ranging disclosures to
prospective and enrolled students. :Jso The disclosures n1ost pertinent to this
discussion arc graduation rates and placen1ent rates. Under the Act,
schools nlnst n1ake this inforn1ation "readily avaHable upon request" to
prospective and enrolled studcnts.:t17 Further, schools nlust "provide to all
enrolled students a list of the inforn1ation that is required to be provided .
together \vith a staten1cnt of the procedures required to obtain such
infOrn1ation_') 35 B By requiring schools to disclose this infonnation, the Act is
ackno\vledging the predon1inant motivation of students engaging in higher
education; it is also n1aking a po\vcrful policy statement-one that places
outcon1cs at the focal point of assessn1ent.
Unfortunately, the manner in \vhich the statute operationalizcs the
rcquire1nents lessens their effectiveness. 'fhe only c\ocun1cntation a school
n1ust provide is a list of inforn1ation it is required to nlakc available, and a
process for obtaining that inforn1ation. In effect, the Act places the onus on
353. ~at'l Advertising Review Bel., http://www.narbre\·iew.org-/ (last visited Aug. 4-,
2010) (":'\ARB is the appeal division of the advertising industry's self-regulatory syslcn1.").
354. Bailey, supra note 292, at S37 (noting that the ad\'crtising industry "has established
two quasi-judicial regulatory bodies to review advertising," and that these agencies arc "a
valuable con1ple1nent to federal and stale efforts to police against deceptive advertising").
355. CJ ICAP REPORTS, supra note 310, at I ("Impartiality is seen to bC' kC'y lo an
effective [self-regulatory] code and public trust in it.").

356. 20 U.S.C. § I092 (2006).
357. Id.§ 1092(a)(l).
358.

Id.
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the student to not only request the inforn1ation, but take the necessary steps
to secure it. It stands to reason that these unnecessary steps limit the
dissemination of this information; therefore, proprietary schools should be
required to affirn1ativcly disclose, at the very least, graduation rates and
placcn1cnt rates to students before cnrolln1cnt and each academic year
thereafter. Such a rcquirc1ncnt \Voulcl not be novel, as the Act already
requires schools to disclose graduation rates and other data to athletes, their
parents, and officials at their secondary schools.: 15 ~i .c\lso, indiYidual states,
like Utah, require proprietary schools to provide en1ploy111ent and
graduation rate data prior to enrolling a student or accepting tuition
payn1cnts.:;bo Such a require1nent \VOuld also 111ake it n1ore difficult for
schools to use bureaucratic inconveniences to discourage students fro1n
obtaining this inforn1ation. Oversight of this rcquiren1ent could be vvithin
the purvic\v of the DOE, vvith assistance fron1 state regulatory and
accrediting agencies.

5.

Expanding Disclosures

Disclosure requircn1ents for proprietary schools should be expanded to
include labor market data, specifically inforn1ation relating to labor
dcn1and and salaI)'.3hl This expansion \VOuld be in direct response to
proprietary school n1arketing and recruit1ncnt practices. Son1e of the
occupational areas for vvhich proprietary schools provide training have little
to no clcn1and.:lfi'.! ;\c\clitionally, salary data is often inflated by adn1issions
represcntatives.:l(i:l Thus, providing this infor111ation to students prior to
enrolln1ent \vill better infonn students, allo\ving the111, as consumers, to
n1ake inforn1ed choices in the n1arketplace.:lG-t Sirnilar to a clisclain1cr, it

359. Id. § !092(e)(2). But src id. § 1092(c)(6} (wai\·ing these rcquirnncnts ''for any
institution or higher education that is a 1nen1ber or an athletic association or athletic
conference that has \'oluntarily published coinpktion or graduation rate data or has agreed
to publish data that ... is substan1ially con1parablc to the inforn1ation required under this
subsection").
360. L'TAH CODE i-\:\:--.·. ~ l 3-34-108 (2009).
361. This proposal :is based on a rccon11ncndation n1adc by the G.AO. Sec GAO,
OvERSl;rrLJED OccL:PATJO:\S, .rnjJm note 22, at 13-1 +.
362. See id. at 8 ("The Stuvlus or qualified job candidates, including proprietary school
graduates, for so1nc occupations occasionally reached dran1atic proportions in sonic states,
exceeding dc1nand by nuios or 10 to 1or1norc."}.
36'.1. See Anti-Fraud Ilearings, .wpm note l 0, at S (slate1ncnt of Honorable George i\Jillcr)
("[C]crtain colleges ... 1nisrcprcscnted graduation rates, pron1ised inflated salaries to
prospective enrollees, [and] enrolled students who did not have the ability to complete
casework .... ").
364. GAO, OVERSLPPLIED 0CCLTPATIO:\"S, ~upm note 22, at 5 (""Csing labor market
prqject:ions provides a rational basis IOr 1naking training invcst1ncnt decisions .... "). But .rec
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\vould also pron1pt proprietary schools to consider the costs of n1aking
clain1s that n1ay not be supported by the data. --ro ensure validity, the
inforn1ation should be con1pilcd by a governmental agency or another
entity certified by the DOE.

co;;c1.csro;;
Proprietary schools play an i1nportant role in broadening access to
higher education. They enroll a large nu1nbcr of students 'vho arc
undcrscrvcd by traditional, nonprofit institutions. These students tcn<l to
be poorer, less educated, and older than students at traditional schools, and
they tend to undertake higher education for very practical reasons. These
characteristics n1akc thc1n n101T susceptible to deceptive n1arketing and
unfounded promises of higher education providers.
Proprietary schools invest heavily in n1arketing and recruitn1ent. They
appeal to the characteristics and n1otivations of their market niche by
pron1oting tangible end results of educational study, such as career
advancen1ent and financial stability. Unfortunately, n1any of their ads and
recruitn1ent practices 111akc representations that arc incon1plctc, or \Vorse,
untrue. These behaviors contribute to Jo,v con1pletion rates and high loan
default rates an1ong proprietary school stuclcnts-outcon1cs that cost
students and taxpayers billions of dollars.
To protect students and taxpayers fron1 proprietary school
n1isrcprescntations and fraud, tighter regulation of their marketing and
recruitn1ent practices should be in1posed. In the area of n1arketing,
proprietary schools should be required to place disclain1crs on fon.vardlooking ads. f\lso, the FTC should expand its regulation of proprietary
school n1arkcting practices and encourage iinpartial self-regulation \.vithin
the industry. In the area of recruitn1ent, proprietary schools should be
required to n1akc affirn1ative and expanded disclosures. The goal of these
reforn1s is to foster disincentives to misrepresentations and fraud. It rnust
be noted that \vhilc the specific focus of this article is proprietary schools,
the proposals could apply to any school that nlakcs forvvard-looking
representations in inducing cnrolln1cnt. In the end, the nlcssagc should be
that vvhilc educational attainn1cnt can, and often docs, yield benefits upon
the possessor, these benefits arc not assured-and because of this, "Your
Results Nfay Vary."

id. (warning that labor tnarkct projections arc "inherently in1prccisc").
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